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7 **Under-Reporting of Medicaid and Welfare**
8 **in the Current Population Survey**
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23 This is a draft circulated for discussion purposes only. It has not yet
24 received review by the California HealthCare Foundation (formerly the Medi-Cal
25 Policy Institute) or RAND's internal quality control process. It is not to be
26 publicly released or cited.
27

28 The research in this paper was conducted while the authors were Research
29 Associates at the Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau. Research
30 results and conclusions expressed are those of the authors and do not
31 necessarily indicate concurrence by the U.S. Census Bureau, the Center for
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33 and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families and the Medi-Cal
34 Policy Institute.
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PREFACE

2 Conventional estimates of the number of uninsured Californians are
3 derived from the Current Population Survey (CPS). Unfortunately, CPS
4 estimates of the number of people receiving Medi-Cal and welfare
5 (AFDC/CalWORKs) are well below the numbers implied by official Medi-Cal
6 records, suggesting that the conventional estimates of the number of uninsured
7 Californians (and their characteristics) are seriously flawed.

8 To improve our understanding of these issues, the California HealthCare
9 Foundation (through its then separate the Medi-Cal Policy Institute—MCPI) and
10 the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children
11 and Families (DHHS-ACF) funded RAND to match CPS data to individual-level
12 administrative data for the Medi-Cal program. With the cooperation of the
13 California Department of Health Services (CDHS), the U.S. Bureau of the
14 Census, and the California Census Research Data Center (CCRDC), that match was
15 performed. This document describes the findings of the analysis of those
16 matched data.

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STATEMENT OF BENEFIT TO THE BUREAU

2 In what follows, the materials in italics are the "Statement of Benefit
3 to the Bureau" from our original proposal. The nonitalicized materials are
4 additional details and benefits based on our actual analysis and findings.

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The proposed project relates directly to the Census Bureau's core mission to improve the quality of its data. These analyses will be informative about the quality of Census Bureau survey data on welfare participation and Medicaid. This study will identify factors associated with misreporting of program participation in the CPS. This information could be used in a variety of ways. Although the results will be based on California data, we believe that they will provide insights that will be applicable nationally. Using the estimates from California, national participation estimates could be adjusted based on the composition of the population (i.e., age, race/ethnicity) and characteristics of the programs (i.e., welfare program type—child-only, 1-parent, and 2-parent). Along the same lines, the results of our analyses for California will be used to improve the imputation procedures for non-response on program participation questions. We believe that this would be a very important contribution of the proposed work. Funding from DHHS-ACF, suggests that they also believe that this analysis is of considerable potential policy relevance.

25 Increasing the benefit to the Bureau, we further note that concerns about
26 the quality of the data are (correctly) pervasive. The Census Bureau's own
27 technical notes, accompanying reports using these data (discussed in the body
28 of this report) explicitly note that the survey data are at radical variance
29 with aggregate counts from administrative data.

30 The tabulations included in this request for release address this concern
31 directly. We first describe the procedures we used to match the two data sets
32 (the Current Population Survey, CPS, and the Medi-Cal Eligibility Data System,
33 MEDS, administrative data from California) and then the magnitude of the
34 discrepancy in reported program participation between them. These tabulations
35 concern Medi-Cal and its two components—welfare and Medi-Cal only.
36 Unfortunately, sample sizes do not appear to be large enough to support
37 additional stratification by Medicaid subprogram. However, we are able to
38 present some tabulations by year.

39 In addition, the CPS currently includes questions on the number of months
40 of participation in welfare and Medicaid. We explicitly compare those
41 responses to the official data. We conclude that while there is some

1 correlation between the CPS responses and the administrative data, the
2 correlation is weak. People appear to be unable to respond correctly to this
3 question. If we truly care about sub-annual estimates, we need a sub-annual
4 survey. We have such a survey—the Survey of Income and Program Participation
5 (SIPP). Therefore, in as much as interview time is a binding constraint
6 (i.e., there are other questions that might be included), we believe that the
7 Census Bureau should consider dropping these questions on the number of months
8 of participation in welfare and Medicaid.

9 We are aware that the Census Bureau has revised the health insurance-
10 related questions to improve the quality of the data. Unfortunately, despite
11 our requests, the Census Bureau was unable to make available to our project
12 either data for current years (2001, 2002, or 2003) or a consistent time
13 series. (Some of our data are “validated” and some are “unvalidated.”) As a
14 result, our data set appears to be too small to be informative about the
15 effect of those changes in the questionnaire.

16
17 *In addition, the proposed analysis of the effects of the CPS*
18 *reference period will provide valuable information about how people*
19 *interpret the questions and whether refinements to the survey*
20 *instruments are warranted. Not only could these findings be used to*
21 *improve the CPS questions, but the findings could also be used to*
22 *guide the design of future surveys that seek to elicit information*
23 *on program participation.*
24

25 This request includes the tabulations on the reference period. As
26 expected, they are informative on the reference period used by the CPS
27 respondents. This is a crucial issue for interpreting CPS responses and for
28 potentially redesigning the survey.

29
30 *Finally, the CPS questionnaire and imputation procedures have*
31 *been redesigned several times in an attempt to improve the accuracy*
32 *of the survey-based estimates. In as much as our data cover the*
33 *periods before and after these changes, we can and will explore the*
34 *extent to which they appear to have improved the quality of the*
35 *data. Of course, we would require more recent data to analyze the*
36 *most recent questionnaire changes.*
37

38 We present limited results on this issue. They suggest that the CPS
39 imputation procedures (known as “hot-decking”) are biased and are biased in a
40 plausible direction. However, imputation is sufficiently rare so that this is
41 probably not an issue worthy of major attention by the Bureau.
42

1 Overall, we believe that the analyses that we have proposed will
2 be of great value to the Census Bureau and more broadly to the
3 policymaking community. The estimates of program participation from
4 the March CPS are widely cited and are used by many researchers to
5 track changes and to evaluate the effectiveness of policy changes.
6 It is important that decisions about future policy changes be made
7 on solid evidence, and improving the quality of the estimates of
8 program participation is an important step towards this important
9 goal.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY/POLICY BRIEF

2 High-quality survey data are crucial to our understanding of the effects
3 of the Medi-Cal program in California, and the nation's social welfare system
4 more broadly. We can tabulate the number of people enrolled in Medi-Cal from
5 the official program records, the Medi-Cal Eligibility Data System (MEDS).
6 However, beyond enrollment counts, understanding Medi-Cal's effects often
7 requires survey data because information is needed on both enrollees and non-
8 enrollees. For example, to assess take-up rates we need to know the number of
9 people enrolled as well as the number of people who are eligible for the
10 program. Similarly, if we want to look at take-up by sub-group, we need more
11 detailed information about the characteristics (e.g., family structure,
12 household income) of enrollees and non-enrollees. Along the same lines, if we
13 are interested in assessing overall levels of health insurance coverage, we
14 need information on the full population (enrollees and non-enrollees) and
15 their private health insurance coverage. This type of information is not
16 available in administrative data, which highlights the importance of high-
17 quality survey data.

18 THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (CPS), UNDER-REPORTING, AND MATCHING

19 The U.S. Bureau of the Census's March Annual Demographic Survey (ADS) to
20 the Current Population Survey (CPS) is the standard data source for analyses
21 of the Medi-Cal program and the nation's social welfare system more broadly.
22 The CPS is a large (about 50,000 households nationally, 6,000 households in
23 California), household survey with information on program participation
24 (including Medicaid/Medi-Cal and welfare), health insurance coverage, and
25 other household characteristics. Two other features of the CPS data are
26 crucial for policy analyses: (1) The ADS data are collected annually in a
27 relatively consistent manner back to the late 1980s—allowing trend and time
28 series analyses; and (2) The data are released promptly—results of the
29 interviews conducted in March are publicly released in late-August or early-
30 September of the same year—allowing nearly real-time tracking of changes.

31 Unfortunately, the CPS is known to under-report program participation,
32 including Medi-Cal. The official CPS report notes the problem explicitly:
33

1 The Current Population Survey (CPS) underreports medicare [stet] and
2 medicaid [stet] coverage compared with enrollment and participation
3 rates from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS),
4 formerly the Health Care Financing Administration. A major reason
5 for the lower CPS estimates is that the CPS is not designed to
6 collect health insurance data; instead, it is largely a labor force
7 survey. Consequently, interviewers receive less training on health
8 insurance concepts. Additionally, many people may not be aware that
9 they or their children are covered by a health insurance program if
10 they have not used covered services recently and therefore fail to
11 report coverage. CMS data, on the other hand, represent the actual
12 number of people (who) enrolled or participated in these programs
13 and are a more accurate source of coverage levels.

14 Furthermore, some analyses suggest that the problem has gotten worse over
15 time.

16 As we will show below, the under-reporting is substantial, but neither
17 its causes, nor its effects, are well understood. Therefore, with funding
18 from the Medi-Cal Policy Institute and the U.S. Department of Health and Human
19 Services, Administration for Children and Families and the cooperation of the
20 U.S. Bureau of the Census and the California Department of Health Services
21 (CDHS), we matched individual-level CPS responses to their corresponding MEDS
22 administrative data records. Specifically, as part of its interview, the CPS
23 attempts to collect Social Security Numbers (SSNs) on all respondents age 15
24 and older. The MEDS data include SSNs for each enrollee. For this project,
25 the Census Bureau supplied a version of the CPS data for 1990 to 2000 that
26 included a scrambled version of the SSN, where available. In addition, the
27 Census Bureau processed a version of the MEDS data for 1989 to 2001 replacing
28 the original SSNs with the same scrambled SSNs. Where possible, we then
29 matched the two files creating a single analysis file with both CPS and MEDS
30 data. To preserve the confidentiality of CPS respondents and Medi-Cal
31 enrollees, the data analysis took place at the UCLA site of the Secure Data
32 Facility of the Census Bureau's California Census Research Data Center. The
33 authors had no access to identifiers (names or Social Security Numbers) and
34 all research results were reviewed to assure that they did not indirectly
35 reveal the identity of or information about CPS respondents or Medi-Cal
36 enrollees.

37 **THE MAGNITUDE OF UNDER-REPORTING AND OUR IMPUTATION MODEL**


38 How serious is the problem of under-reporting? Previous analyses of this
39 question using unmatched data have been limited by the inconsistencies between

1 the two data sources. The CPS, administered in March, asks about program
2 enrollment *at any time* in the last calendar year (i.e., the 2000 CPS asks
3 about program participation between January and December 1999). Aggregate
4 Medi-Cal data is usually reported in terms of persons covered per month. The
5 extent to which discrepancies in aggregate counts based on unmatched data were
6 real as opposed to being an artifact of different data concepts has therefore
7 been unclear. Given the structure of our matched data, we can tabulate the
8 individual level Medi-Cal data from MEDS to be consistent with the CPS
9 questions and thus provide a better estimate of under-reporting in the CPS.

10 Figure ES.1 summarizes that analysis. It considers two age groups
11 (adults-15-65 at the interview, and children-0-14 at the interview) and three
12 program concepts: cash assistance/welfare (W-Welfare), and non-cash
13 assistance Medi-Cal (MO-Medi-Cal Only), and all Medi-Cal (M)-the sum of the
14 other two. Averaged over the entire period, CPS estimates of total Medi-Cal
15 enrollment for adults are only 88 percent of the counts from the official MEDS
16 administrative data, i.e., Medi-Cal is under-reported by about 12 percent.
17 For children, reporting of Medi-Cal is even worse, about 70 percent. Unlike
18 some national estimates, there is little evidence of a decline in reporting
19 over time.

20 This overall pattern in Medi-Cal hides a strong divergence by Medi-Cal
21 sub-program. Enrollment in welfare is severely under-reported, over the
22 entire time period about 47 percent for adults and 45 percent for children.
23 For welfare, there is clear evidence of a sharp drop in reporting rates over
24 time. The timing of the drop (in the late 1990s) is nearly simultaneous with
25 the implementation of welfare reform in California (i.e., CalWORKs), perhaps
26 suggesting an increase in the stigma of welfare participation.

27 At the same time, reporting rates for Medi-Cal Only are much higher, 88
28 percent for adults and 113 percent for children (i.e., the CPS estimates for
29 children are higher than the administrative data counts). Further analyses
30 suggest that the results for welfare and Medi-Cal only are related. Many
31 people with welfare report Medi-Cal, but not welfare. The net result is
32 under-reporting of welfare and higher reporting rates (sometimes over-
33 reporting) of Medi-Cal Only.



1 **Figure ES.1—Reporting Rates (CPS relative to MEDS) by Age and Program**

2 Source: Tabulations from RAND Merged MEDS File

3 This under-reporting is severe enough to have substantively important
 4 effects on our understanding of the effects of the Medi-Cal program. Here, we
 5 consider two effects. First, under-reporting will lead us to under-estimate
 6 take-up rates (the fraction of eligibles enrolled in the program) and thus to
 7 over-estimate the need for efforts to increase enrollment or new programs to
 8 provide additional coverage. Second, under-reporting will lead us to over-
 9 estimate the total number of uninsured people.

10 Our analysis proceeds as follows. For those providing a SSN, we
 11 overwrite the CPS Medi-Cal responses with the official information from the
 12 Medi-Cal administrative data (i.e., treating the MEDS information as the
 13 truth). However, our ability to match the survey and administrative data is
 14 constrained by the fact that only about 57 percent of CPS adults provide a
 15 SSN. Furthermore, children under 15 were never asked for a SSN. To address
 16 this problem, we build an imputation model to predict mis-reporting among
 17 those people without a SSN who we cannot match to the MEDS data. The response
 18 errors (i.e., reporting no Medi-Cal in the CPS given actually having Medi-Cal
 19 and reporting having Medi-Cal in the CPS given not actually having Medi-Cal)
 20 among those not providing a SSN are assumed to follow the general pattern in
 21 the sub-sample who do provide a SSN, with an adjustment to force the totals to

1 align exactly (see the full report for details). The problem is more
2 pronounced for children since SSNs are not collected in the CPS for people
3 under age 15. To address this issue we use a combination of information from
4 the head of household and our imputation model. Specifically, where the head
5 of the household provides a SSN (as is true for about 61 percent of CPS
6 children), we use the head's Medi-Cal status (from the MEDS or from our
7 imputation) to impute Medi-Cal status to the child. Some Medi-Cal programs
8 include children, but not adults. Therefore, in cases where the child has
9 Medi-Cal, but the head of household does not, the child's data are not
10 changed. Again, as with adults, the imputation includes an adjustment to
11 force the CPS totals (after imputation) to align exactly to the MEDS counts
12 (again, see the full report for details).

13 These imputations are performed for every observation in the CPS. The
14 resulting individual level file allows us to construct improved estimates of
15 take-up rates and uninsurance coverage. Using the individual-level imputation
16 file, we can consider the effects of under-reporting by respondent
17 characteristics (e.g., gender, age, income).

18 **THE EFFECTS OF UNDER-REPORTING ON ESTIMATES OF MEDI-CAL TAKE-UP**

19 If Medi-Cal enrollment is under-reported, then Medi-Cal take-up will also
20 be under-reported. We have seen that the under-reporting of Medi-Cal is
21 substantial, about 12 percent for adults and 30 percent for children. Our
22 analyses of the matched file suggest that the under-reporting is also not
23 uniform across sub-groups of the population, so the effects of under-reporting
24 on take-up rates are also not uniform.

25 Table ES.1 summarizes our findings on Medi-Cal take-up. For our most
26 recent data (calendar year 1999/survey year 2000), we estimate a raw (i.e.,
27 not adjusted for under-reporting) take-up rate (i.e., the fraction of the full
28 population enrolled in any type of Medi-Cal) of 9 percent among adults and 24
29 percent for children. Accounting for under-reporting increases our estimated
30 take-up rates by nearly half to 13 percent for adults and 35 percent for
31 children.

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Table ES.1
Take-Up Rates: Unadjusted, Adjusted, Discrepancy
Medi-Cal, for Calendar Year 1999/Survey Year 2000

	Adults			Children		
	Raw	Imputed	Delta	Raw	Imputed	Delta
All	9%	13%	42%	24%	35%	50%
Male	7%	9%	37%	24%	35%	49%
Female	11%	17%	45%	23%	35%	51%
SW w/kids	25%	36%	46%	23%	35%	51%
SW w/kids <50% FPL	49%	59%	21%	47%	65%	38%
SW w/kids 50%-100% FPL	48%	63%	31%	52%	67%	30%
SW w/kids 100%-150% FPL	41%	55%	34%	37%	51%	38%
SW w/kids 150%-200% FPL	24%	45%	84%	22%	54%	139%
SW w/kids >200% FPL	8%	16%	104%	7%	13%	72%

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NOTE: "Raw" is the unadjusted CPS estimate; "Imputed" is the adjusted CPS estimate, based on the multiply-imputed data set; and "Delta" is the percentage (not percentage point) increase in estimated take-up with imputation; "SW" is an abbreviation for single women.

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As noted above, the effects of adjusting for under-reporting are not uniform across sub-groups of the population. They are relatively small for adult men, who are rarely eligible for Medi-Cal. They are larger for adult women as a group. Perhaps because of varying stigma of reporting Medi-Cal participation, the adjustments are smallest for female-headed families with children at or near the poverty line and larger for families with income just above the poverty line. This larger under-reporting for families with income just above the poverty line is particularly important because they have been the target of policy initiatives (e.g., the Section 1931(b) program and the proposed, but never implemented, expansion of Healthy Families to adults).

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As expected, for children, there is little divergence in adjustment by gender. The patterns for children living in female-headed families by income are similar to those for adults, lower under-reporting for those below poverty, more under-reporting for those just above poverty. Again, differential stigma is a likely explanation. The divergence is particularly policy relevant because this group (near poor children) with the largest under-reporting has been the target of recent policy initiatives (e.g., the Medicaid Expansions, the Section 1931(b) program, Healthy Families).

28

THE EFFECTS OF UNDER-REPORTING ON ESTIMATES OF UNINSURANCE

29
30

Another consequence of under-reporting of Medi-Cal enrollment is that it will lead to over-estimates of the rates of uninsurance in the CPS. The

1 magnitude of the over-estimate will depend on the extent to which those under-
 2 reporting have other sources of health insurance at some point during the
 3 year. If it were the case that everyone who under-reports Medi-Cal did not
 4 have any other source of insurance, then we could construct a better estimate
 5 of the number of uninsured by subtracting the estimate of under-reporting
 6 (i.e., the percent of people in the CPS who report no Medi-Cal, but who our
 7 imputation model, based on the matched data, suggests are enrolled) from the
 8 raw estimate of the percent of people who are uninsured in the CPS.
 9 Conversely, if it were the case that everyone who under-reports Medi-Cal also
 10 has private health insurance, then under-reporting would have no effect on the
 11 estimates of the uninsured. Our analyses suggest that the truth lies
 12 somewhere between these two extremes. Plausibly, we find that under-reporting
 13 is more common among those with private health insurance, but under-reporting
 14 also includes large numbers of people without private health insurance.

15 From our matched file, we tabulate rates of other health insurance among
 16 people who under-report Medi-Cal. Here we report adjusted estimates of
 17 uninsurance based on several different scenarios.

18 Table ES.2 summarizes our findings for rates of uninsurance. We estimate
 19 that under-reporting is about 4.1 percent for adults (i.e., 4.1 percent have
 20 Medi-Cal but do not report it to the CPS). Consistent with much higher rates
 21 of Medi-Cal coverage for children, the corresponding rate of under-reporting
 22 is much higher. We estimate that 11.8 percent of all children have Medi-Cal,
 23 but do not report it. This result is shown in the first row of the table.
 24 The second row of the table reports the unadjusted, or raw, estimate of
 25 uninsurance, 23.2 percent for adults, slightly lower, 21.9 percent, for
 26 children.

27 **Table ES.2**
 28 **Take-Up Rates: Unadjusted, Adjusted, Discrepancy**
 29 **Medi-Cal, for Calendar Year 1999/Survey Year 2000**

Correction for Under-Reporting and Dual Coverage (DC)	Adults		Children	
	DC	UI	DC	UI
A: Under-reported		4.1%		11.8%
B: Unadjusted, or raw		23.2%		21.9%
C: Assuming no dual coverage (B-A)	0.0%	19.1%	0.0%	10.1%
D: Dual coverage based on all Medi-Cal	27.6%	20.2%	20.3%	12.5%
E: Dual coverage based on False Negatives	31.2%	20.4%	40.2%	14.9%
F: Full imputation model	34.4%	20.5%	45.0%	15.4%

30 Note: "DC"—Dual Coverage, UI—Percent Uninsured

1 Under the first scenario that we outlined above, in which none of the
2 people who under-report Medi-Cal have any other source of insurance, we can
3 subtract the under-reporting percentage from the raw estimate of uninsurance
4 to obtain an adjusted estimate. This estimate is presented in the third row
5 of the table. The results in row C show that if we assume no dual coverage,
6 the rates of uninsurance drop dramatically: For adults from 23.2 percent to
7 19.1 percent, for children from 21.9 percent to 10.1 percent.

8 The next three rows of the table consider alternative methods for
9 adjusting estimates for the magnitude of dual coverage. The results in row D
10 use the information in the public use CPS file to estimate the prevalence of
11 dual coverage (i.e., the percent of Medi-Cal enrollees who also report having
12 private insurance) and use this information to break out the portion of under-
13 reporters who have dual coverage. In the CPS public use file, about 27.6
14 percent of adults and 20.3 percent of children who report Medi-Cal also report
15 private health insurance. The results in row E use that estimate of dual
16 coverage to estimate uninsurance. As expected, accounting for some dual
17 coverage increases the estimate of uninsurance above that when no dual
18 coverage is assumed.

19 Because we have matched data, we can do a more sophisticated adjustment.
20 Our population of interest is not everyone enrolled in Medi-Cal, but those
21 enrolled in Medi-Cal who do not report this in the CPS (call them false
22 negatives). We can identify those people in our matched sample and look at
23 dual coverage among this group. Consistent with a stigma explanation, this
24 group is much more likely to report having other health insurance (31.2
25 percent for adults; 20.3 percent for children) than everyone in the CPS who
26 reports Medi-Cal enrollment. Therefore, when we use the matched sample to
27 account for dual coverage based on the false negatives, rather than the full
28 sample of Medi-Cal enrollees, we see that the estimated rate of uninsurance
29 increases for both adults and children (relative to line C of Table ES.2).

30 The final row (row F) of the table presents our preferred estimates.
31 They are based on our full imputation model and include a correction for those
32 who spuriously report Medi-Cal, when the administrative data do not report
33 Medi-Cal. Our analyses suggest that this group includes a large group of
34 people who gained Medi-Cal between the end of the CPS reference year in
35 December and the CPS interview in March. The full model suggests even higher
36 rates of dual coverage (34.4 percent of adults and 45.0 percent for children).

1 Our preferred estimates are thus closer to the unadjusted estimate than to the
2 simpler estimates. The adjustment is, however large. For calendar year
3 1999/interview year 2000, the simple estimate for adults is 23.2 percent. Our
4 preferred estimate is 12 percent lower, 20.5 percent. For children, the
5 unadjusted estimate is 21.9 percent; our preferred estimate is 15.4 percent,
6 30 percent lower.

7 **SUMMARY**

8 This Policy Brief has considered the quality of Medi-Cal information in the
9 Current Population Survey, the standard data source for tabulations of Medi-
10 Cal take-up and levels of uninsurance. The analyses are based on an
11 imputation model derived from a match of individual-level survey data with
12 individual-level administrative data for the Medi-Cal program. We find
13 sizable under-reporting of Medi-Cal, leading to sizable under-estimates of
14 Medi-Cal take-up and sizable over-estimates of the fraction of Californians
15 who are uninsured. These results cover the period 1990 to 2000. The Census
16 Bureau made some adjustments to the CPS interview towards the end of this
17 period. Nevertheless, these results suggest caution in basing policy on
18 unadjusted analyses of the CPS data. Analyses based on unadjusted data are
19 likely to substantially overestimate the magnitude of the problem, especially
20 for children.

21

1

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7 Leonard Sternbach–have been waiting patiently for these results and we
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9 This analysis is based on a unique dataset constructed by matching
10 confidential Census Current Population Survey data to confidential
11 administrative data on the Medi-Cal program. Doing so has required the
12 cooperation of several groups. Gene Hiehle and the California Department of
13 Health Services provided the Medi-Cal administrative data and have been
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29 The data analysis for this project is based on the data preparation work
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11 improved the final product.

1

GLOSSARY, LIST OF SYMBOLS, ETC.

Symbol	Definition
ADS	CPS March Annual Demographic Survey
AFDC	Aid to Families with Dependent Children
CalWORKs	California Work Opportunities and Responsibility to Kids Act (1997)
CRDC	Census Research Data Center
CCRDC	California Census Research Data Center
CDHS	California Department of Health Services
CDSS	California Department of Social Services
CHCF	California HealthCare Foundation
CHIP	Child Health Insurance Programs (established by statute in 1997, operated by the states)
CMS	Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
CPS	Current Population Survey
ESHI	Employer Sponsored Health Insurance
HCFA	Health Care Financing Administration
MEDS	Medi-Cal Eligibility Data System
MCPI	Medi-Cal Policy Institute
NIPA	National Income and Product Accounts
OHI	Other Health Insurance
PIK	Person Identification Key
SIPP	Survey of Income and Program Participation
SSA	Social Security Administration
SSI	Supplemental Security Income
SSN	Social Security Number
TANF	Temporary Assistance to Needy Families

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1

1. INTRODUCTION

2 High-quality survey data are crucial to our understanding of the effects
3 of the nation's social welfare system. If all one wants to know is the number
4 of people participating in a program, then that information can be obtained
5 from administrative data. However, very often, both researchers and
6 policymakers want to know take-up rates (i.e., the fraction of people enrolled
7 in the program) and the effects of the program on subsequent outcomes (e.g.,
8 probability of lacking any health insurance, probability of living in poverty,
9 etc.). For these outcomes, we need richer data that can only be gleaned from
10 surveys; in particular, we need: (1) information on the number and
11 characteristics of nonparticipants; and (2) information on participating
12 families not recorded in administrative data.

13 Unfortunately, there is considerable evidence that the quality of
14 existing survey data on program participation is poor. There are indications
15 that survey data significantly under-report participation in safety-net
16 programs relative to aggregate administrative counts and also that the under-
17 reporting has increased over time. However, most of the evidence to date is
18 based on comparisons between aggregate administrative counts and estimates
19 from survey data. It is our belief that a better understanding of the nature
20 and scope of under-reporting can be obtained by comparing administrative and
21 survey data at the individual level and that is what we seek to do in this
22 report.

23 This document reports the results of a record-match study of individual-
24 level administrative data for Medi-Cal—the Medicaid program in California, and
25 the Current Population Survey (CPS). With funding from the California
26 HealthCare Foundation (CHCF; through its then separate Medi-Cal Policy
27 Institute—MCPI) and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
28 Administration for Children and Families (DHHS-ACF), and the cooperation of
29 the U.S. Bureau of the Census, the California Department of Health Services
30 (CDHS), and the California Census Research Data Center (CCRDC), we matched
31 administrative data for Medi-Cal from the Medi-Cal Eligibility Data System,
32 (MEDS) to March CPS data for 1990 to 2000. In California, everyone receiving
33 cash assistance (sometimes referred to as welfare)—through Aid to Families
34 with Dependent Children (AFDC), later Temporary Assistance to Needy families

1 (TANF)/California Work Opportunities and Responsibility to Kids (CalWORKs)—is
2 automatically enrolled in Medi-Cal. Since the MEDS administrative data allow
3 us to identify the “type” of Medi-Cal coverage (i.e., why the person is
4 eligible for Medi-Cal), we are able to consider overall Medi-Cal coverage and
5 its two components—welfare and Medi-Cal only (i.e., Medi-Cal, but not
6 welfare)—in our analysis.

7 **PLAN OF THE REPORT**

8 This report proceeds as follows. The balance of this opening chapter
9 reviews the existing literature on the quality of the CPS data on Medicaid and
10 welfare. The second chapter provides background information on the
11 Medicaid/Medi-Cal program, the MEDS (administrative) data, and the CPS
12 (survey) data. It then characterizes the under-reporting problem, using
13 separate tabulations from each data source. In the third chapter, we turn to
14 the matched data file. For the subset of individuals who provide a valid
15 Social Security Number (SSN), we describe the nature of reporting biases based
16 on a one-to-one match of the survey and administrative data. Unfortunately,
17 not all survey respondents provide a SSN. The fourth chapter provides a
18 technical discussion of our methods for using information from the matched
19 data to impute welfare and Medi-Cal for the entire California CPS sample. In
20 the fifth chapter, we use the resulting multiply-imputed file to reconsider
21 some of the substantive issues for which the CPS is used. In particular, we
22 explore program take-up by (reported) household income and family structure
23 and levels of uninsurance. The final chapter considers the implications of
24 the results.

25 **PREVIOUS LITERATURE ON UNDER-REPORTING**

26 The conventional source for information on program take-up is the CPS,
27 the largest annual, national survey. Beginning with the March 1995 CPS, the
28 Census Bureau (Benenfield, 1996a), the Congressional Budget Office (Bilheimer,
29 1997), General Accounting Office (1997), and the Employee Benefits Research
30 Institute (Fronstin, 1996) each publish annual CPS-based estimates of health
31 insurance coverage and uninsurance. However, the CPS-based estimates of
32 health insurance coverage are much lower and estimates of uninsurance much
33 higher than tabulations from other surveys, such as Survey of Income and

1 Program Participation (SIPP) or the National Survey of America's Families
2 (NSAF) (Bennefield, 1998; Lewis, Ellwood, Czajka, 1998; Fronstin, 2000).¹

3 In addition and of particular relevance to this study, CPS estimates of
4 Medicaid coverage (Medi-Cal in California) are much lower than corresponding
5 tabulations from administrative data on Medicaid (and Medi-Cal in California),
6 suggesting that survey respondents under-report Medicaid/Medi-Cal coverage.
7 The Urban Institute's TRIM2 model (used by DHHS to simulate program costs)
8 based estimates of the number of uninsured on administrative data from Health
9 Care Financing Administration/ Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
10 (HCFA/CMS) to partially correct for such under-reporting. For 1995, this
11 correction for underreporting lowers the fraction of children (0-17) uninsured
12 by 31 percent and the fraction of all non-elderly individuals (0-65) uninsured
13 by 11 percent.²

14 As part of a discussion of the decline in Medicaid coverage, Ku and Bruen
15 (1999) summarize the national issues and their effect on our understanding of
16 policy.

- 17
- 18 1) "CPS data indicate that about 2.5 million fewer non-elderly
19 people got Medicaid in 1997 than in 1995 (9.3 percent fewer),
20 while administrative data indicate that 1.2 million (3.2
21 percent) lost Medicaid."
22
 - 23 2) "CPS data indicate that more children lost coverage than adults
24 from 1995 to 1997, while administrative data indicate [that] the
25 declines were larger for adults."
26
 - 27 3) "[T]he total number of nonelderly people who had Medicaid at any
28 time in a given year was about 25 to 30 percent lower in the CPS
29 than in administrative counts."
30
 - 31 4) "[T]here appears to be a growing discrepancy between CPS and
32 administrative data concerning the receipt of benefits like
33 Medicaid, welfare, and food stamps in recent years. . . . Using
34 measures of enrollment during the year, the CPS Medicaid
35 participation estimates were 75 percent of administrative counts
36 in 1995, but fell to 70 percent in 1997."³

¹ Other papers focusing on question wording for health insurance items include Rajan et al. (2000), and Nelson and Mills (2001).

² For similar comments about welfare, see <http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/assess1.pdf>.

³ Furthermore, concern about the problem has increased. See, for example, Levit et al. (1992, pp. 45-46), reflecting minimal concern about undercounting. "CPS counts of people covered by Medicare and Medicaid programs are reasonably consistent with Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) program data after allowing for the institutional component missing

1
2 5) "Some believe that respondents to the CPS may be reporting their
3 current insurance status, rather than answering the actual
4 question about insurance at any time in the prior year."
5

6 Such reporting biases would cause over-estimates of the number of
7 uninsured Americans and, thus, of the demand for the programs being created by
8 new policy initiatives. Lower than expected enrollment has in fact been a
9 problem (Alpha Center, 2000). While simple reporting bias is unlikely to
10 explain all the lower than expected enrollment, such reporting bias has
11 explicitly been cited by some observers (e.g., Alpha Center, 2000).

12 The problem of under-reporting is perceived to be so severe that the
13 official U.S. Bureau of the Census report on health Insurance (P60-220, 2002)
14 notes it explicitly and at length in its "Technical Note":
15

16 The Current Population Survey (CPS) underreports medicare [stet] and
17 medicaid [stet] coverage compared with enrollment and participation
18 rates from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS),
19 formerly the Health Care Financing Administration. A major reason
20 for the lower CPS estimates is that the CPS is not designed to
21 collect health insurance data; instead, it is largely a labor force
22 survey. Consequently, interviewers receive less training on health
23 insurance concepts. Additionally, many people may not be aware that
24 they or their children are covered by a health insurance program if
25 they have not used covered services recently and therefore fail to
26 report coverage. CMS data, on the other hand, represent the actual
27 number of people (who) enrolled or participated in these programs
28 and are a more accurate source of coverage levels.
29

30 The problem of under-reporting appears to be particularly severe for
31 welfare. Welfare recipients are categorically eligible for Medicaid. In
32 fact, the CPS imputes Medicaid to anyone who reports receiving welfare.
33 However, welfare reform appears to have worsened reporting of welfare in the
34 CPS, perhaps because of confusion over program names, perhaps because of
35 increased stigma of welfare receipt.
36

from CPS." They compare the 1991 CPS estimate (for 1990) of 24.3 million persons to the HCFA Medicaid program estimate of 25.3 persons. They attribute the difference (only about 4 percent) to "the institutionalized population not included in CPS and difficulties that surveys have capturing Medicaid recipients." They note that estimates of change over time (in particular 1980 to 1991) are quite similar across the CPS and HCFA data.

See Fronstin (1997), HCFA (1996), and Lewis, Ellwood, and Czjaka (1998) for claims that Medicaid under-reporting has increased.

1 **2. MEDI-CAL, THE CPS, THE MEDS, AND UNDER-REPORTING**

2 The core of this project is a data match between administrative data for
3 California's Medicaid program—Medi-Cal (i.e., the MEDS data)—and CPS data.
4 This section begins with a brief description of the Medi-Cal program. It then
5 describes the administrative data (the MEDS) and the survey data (the CPS).
6 Finally, we provide some simple tabulations using the *unmatched* data.

7 **THE MEDI-CAL PROGRAM**

8 Since 1965, Medicaid—a joint federal-state program—has provided health
9 insurance to current welfare recipients and some other qualifying families.
10 During the 1980s and 1990s, coverage was significantly expanded, with
11 particular attention to poor children (often referred to as “the percent
12 programs”) and families that are welfare-eligible, whether they are actually
13 on welfare or not (the 1931(b) program).⁴ California's Medicaid program,
14 Medi-Cal, is a joint effort of the California Department of Health Services
15 (CDHS), which administers the program and handles payments, and the California
16 Department of Social Services (CDSS), which supervises county welfare
17 departments that handle enrollment and re-enrollment.⁵

18 Figure 2.1 (and Table 2.1) shows Medi-Cal enrollment from the MEDS data
19 (described below) according to the CPS concepts we will use in our main
20 analysis. In particular, we tabulate the total number of individuals enrolled
21 at any time in the calendar year. We distinguish welfare from other Medi-Cal
22 (Medi-Cal only, or simply “MO”). Finally, we consider only the non-elderly,
23 in two groups: those 0-14 as of the following March (who we refer to as
24 “Children”) and those 15-65 as of the following March (who we refer to as
25 “Adults”; we discuss the reason for this child/adult break at 14/15 below).

⁴ For more discussion of these eligibility changes and their effects, see Gruber (2000).

⁵ For more information on Medi-Cal and its multiple programs see: <http://www.medi-cal.org/> and its fact sheet: <http://www.medi-cal.org/resources/view.cfm?section=Resources&itemID=1397>. For more information on the administration of Medi-Cal, see Klerman and Cox (2003).




Figure 2.1—Medi-Cal Enrollment, in California, by Age, Welfare and Total

Source: Tabulations from RAND Merged MEDS File

Table 2.1
Medi-Cal Enrollment in California (millions of persons)

Year	Adults			Children		
	M	W	MO	M	W	MO
1989	2.06	1.47	0.59	1.98	1.08	0.90
1990	2.28	1.60	0.68	2.22	1.15	1.07
1991	2.62	1.78	0.84	2.57	1.26	1.31
1992	2.89	1.90	0.99	2.84	1.33	1.51
1993	3.10	1.99	1.11	3.01	1.41	1.60
1994	3.21	2.05	1.16	3.10	1.46	1.65
1995	3.23	2.05	1.18	3.10	1.44	1.66
1996	3.18	1.98	1.20	3.00	1.40	1.60
1997	3.05	1.83	1.22	2.84	1.28	1.56
1998	2.89	1.63	1.26	2.67	1.13	1.54
1999	2.94	1.46	1.47	2.80	0.98	1.81

Source: RAND tabulations from merged MEDS file.

Note: M-Medi-Cal, W-Welfare, MO-Medi-Cal Only.

Tabulated according to CPS concepts: Enrollment is at any time in calendar year (not in each month); Adults are 15-65 in March of the next year; Children are 0-14 in March of the next year.

1 In the late 1980s, Medi-Cal had just over 4 million enrollees,
2 approximately evenly divided between adults and children and between welfare
3 and Medi-Cal Only (i.e., during the calendar year at least some Medi-Cal, but
4 never welfare). During the early 1990s, the number of enrollees grew rapidly
5 to over 6 million because of a combination of two factors. First, program
6 eligibility was deliberately expanded. Second, California's deep recession
7 made more people income-eligible, especially through rapid growth in
8 welfare/cash assistance.

9 From the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, Medi-Cal enrollment has remained
10 relatively stable, near 6 million. This stability is the result of offsetting
11 trends in Medi-Cal sub-programs such as welfare and 1931(b). First, as in the
12 rest of the nation, there has been a sharp drop in welfare/cash assistance
13 since the early 1990s. Second, as was intended (but after a transition
14 period), the 1931(b) program's growth has more than offset the shrinkage in
15 cash assistance. Third, the other components of Medi-Cal such as Supplemental
16 Security Income (SSI), Medically Needy, and "Other" are relatively stable.

17 **THE MEDI-CAL ELIGIBILITY DATA SYSTEM (MEDS)**

18 Real-time enrollment information in Medi-Cal is maintained in the MEDS.
19 County welfare departments update this system as individuals are enrolled in
20 or drop out from the program. Providers check the system to verify whether an
21 individual is covered or not, and which services would be reimbursed by the
22 Medi-Cal program. Individual-level extracts from the file provide a complete
23 historical record of Medi-Cal eligibility for 1987 forward. Crucially for our
24 purposes, the file includes linking information (name, Social Security Number—
25 SSN), some basic demographics (gender, date of birth, race/ethnicity), and
26 detailed Medi-Cal program information.

27 In our analysis below, we treat the MEDS records as "truth." This is a
28 reasonable approximation given their use by providers in determining whether
29 care will be reimbursed. However, the MEDS data are not always absolutely
30 correct. Careful study of the MEDS data suggests some anomalies when counties
31 had trouble updating the records (e.g., for two months in late 1990, there is
32 a period of a few months when there appear to be no entries onto welfare for
33 Los Angeles County). Furthermore, there is some retrospective eligibility
34 that is recorded in the MEDS data but that might not be known to the
35 respondent as of a survey interview. Card, Hildreth, and Shore-Sheppard note

1 some seam bias (sharp increases in transition rates across versions of the
2 MEDS file), which also suggests some reporting error in the MEDS.⁶

3 In addition, we note that some people may be enrolled in Medi-Cal but
4 might not be aware of it. In particular, the Edwards v. Kizer decision
5 requires California's counties to continue Medi-Cal eligibility for welfare
6 leavers until their eligibility for continued Medi-Cal can be determined.
7 Moreover, California's implementation of the Medicaid 1931(b) program and the
8 provisions of California SB 87 have the effect of keeping many welfare leavers
9 on Medi-Cal even without filing an application.⁷ It is widely believed that
10 many of these people do not realize they are covered.

11 **THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (CPS)**

12 The CPS is a monthly survey of about 50,000 households conducted by the
13 U.S. Bureau of the Census for the U.S. Department of Labor.⁸ The CPS's
14 primary purpose is to provide official monthly estimates of the unemployment
15 rate, a key business cycle indicator. With its associated sampling weights,
16 it represents the American non-institutional population.⁹

⁶ See Card, Hildreth, and Shore-Sheppard (2001) for some further discussion of these issues. The seam bias problem should be less severe in the annual reference period of the CPS which we analyze than in the monthly reference period of the SIPP that Card, Hildreth, and Shore-Sheppard analyze. Note also that their biggest matching problems are with children, for whom we do not have SSNs and therefore do not match. Finally, note that below we limit our sample to the validated records which should increase the quality of the SSN data.

⁷ Medicaid Section 1931(b) was a new program created by federal welfare reform (the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Act of 1996) to guarantee Medicaid to any family that would have been eligible for welfare before welfare reform. Section 1931(b) also gave states the option of expanding 1931(b) eligibility to align it with eligibility for cash assistance. California did so with the net effect that welfare leavers with income up to about 165 percent of the poverty line remain indefinitely eligible for Medi-Cal. In practice, implementation of Section 1931(b) in California was delayed until early 1999, but indirect effects (the "Edwards Hold," see Klerman and Cox, 2004) were felt beginning in early 1998.

California SB 87 (chaptered September 30, 2000, effective July 1, 2001) streamlined continued enrollment in Medi-Cal for welfare leavers through adoption of an ex parte process and, in practice, a presumption of continued eligibility for Medi-Cal among welfare leavers. This implementation occurred after the period covered by our data.

⁸ For more on the CPS, see <http://www.bls.census.gov/cps/overmain.htm>.

⁹ The restriction of the CPS universe to the non-institutional population is potentially problematic for analyses of Medi-Cal. While most Medi-Cal enrollees are young, most Medi-Cal expenditures go to the elderly in nursing homes. That group is not in CPS's universe, which is the non-institutional

1 Since 1948, in its spring survey the CPS has included additional
2 questions on annual income in the previous year.¹⁰ Today, those additional
3 questions are asked at the end of the March survey (corresponding to the
4 arrival of W-2s and household preparation of federal income tax returns) and
5 are referred to collectively as the Annual Demographic Survey (ADS). Over the
6 years, the set of supplementary questions has grown.

7 Most important for our purposes, since 1980, the ADS has included
8 detailed questions on health insurance coverage and welfare receipt in the
9 previous calendar year (not as of the date of the March interview).¹¹ These
10 questions began as an attempt to expand the definition of "income" to include
11 employee benefits and noncash government benefits (Food Stamps, subsidized
12 housing, medical assistance, etc.). Combining the questions on health
13 insurance as an employee benefit with the questions on participation in
14 government health insurance programs yielded a rough measure of total health
15 insurance coverage; its complement provided an estimate of those without
16 health insurance. Until the 2000 interview, the last included in our analysis
17 file, there was no direct question in the CPS about being uninsured. Rather
18 uninsured status is inferred from answers to questions about receipt of
19 Medicaid and other types of health insurance (see below Table 2.2 for a
20 summary of changes to the CPS questionnaire).

21 As this discussion suggests, the individual questions were not originally
22 intended to generate an estimate of the size of the population without health
23 insurance. With issues of uninsurance becoming more salient, in 1988, the
24 Census Bureau refined the questions.¹² Questions about employer-based health
25 insurance that previously had only been asked of employed individuals were
26 asked of all individuals 15 or older, regardless of whether they worked. This

population. The MEDS data do not have a flag for institutional residence. As a partial correction, our analyses below exclude those age 65 and over.

¹⁰ For more on the March Annual Demographic Supplement to the CPS, see: <http://www.bls.census.gov/cps/ads/adsdes.htm>.

¹¹ This discussion draws on Nelson and Mills (2001).

¹² In addition, in 1983, the Census Bureau began a second national survey, the SIPP). The SIPP is a moderate-sized panel survey with more detailed questions on income and program participation (as its name implies). The original vision appears to have been that the SIPP would replace the CPS-ADS for many purposes, including the measurement of health insurance. However, for a variety of reasons (including varying sample size, issues related to its panel structure, and slow data release; see Short, 2001), the CPS remains the primary data source for counts of the uninsured. For an analysis similar to this one for the SIPP, see Card et al. (2001).

1 change should have captured retiree coverage and COBRA benefits (i.e.,
 2 benefits from a previous employer). In addition, for children, questions were
 3 added about health insurance coverage from individuals not residing in the
 4 household. This change should have captured coverage provided by non-
 5 coresident parents. Finally, the imputation methods for children's coverage
 6 were revised and additional questions on Medicaid were added (see Levit et
 7 al., 1992; Moyer, 1989; Swartz and Purcell, 1989; and EBRI, 2000).

8 Additional changes have been made since then. (See also Swartz, 1997;
 9 EBRI, 2000.) Table 2.2 presents a detailed chronology. Census analyses
 10 suggest that the changes in survey years 1996 and 2000 increased reported
 11 health insurance coverage by about 1 percentage point each.

12 **Table 2.2**
 13 **Chronology of CPS-ADS Changes and Effect on Health Insurance Coverage**


Year	Change	Effect on Health Insurance Coverage
1981	First health insurance questions (employer sponsored and government sponsored) on CPS-ADS	<Not applicable>
1988	Introduction of new CPS processing system	Minimal
1989	Addition of questions on child health insurance coverage (previously coverage of children was imputed based on adult responses)	Moderate
1993	Switch to 1990 Census population controls	Minimal
1994	Switch from paper and pencil to Computer Aided Personal Interviews	Minimal
1996	Questions reordered and modified to improve information on Medicaid	Possibly moderate; see Swartz (1997).
1998	Indian Health Service no longer considered coverage	Minimal
2000	Verification questions added	Moderate (about 1 percentage point)
2001	Switch to 2000 Census population controls	Minimal (less than 1 percentage point)
2001	Addition of questions on state CHIP programs	
2002	Additional sample (78,000 rather than 50,000) to estimate state health insurance coverage rates	Minimal (less than 1 percentage point)

14 Note: "Year" refers to the survey year. The CPS questions refer to the
 15 previous calendar year; i.e. "2001" refers to the survey conducted in March of
 16 2001, collecting information about calendar year 2000. Effect is on the total
 17 national coverage rates. Purely because of sampling issues, effects are
 18 larger at the state level. Because of substantive issues, effects are often
 19 larger for components (e.g., Medicaid). "Minimal" is less than 1 percentage
 20 point; "Moderate" is more than one percentage point.

1 Corresponding to the fact that California has 12 percent of the national
 2 population, the annual March ADS to the CPS has about 6,000 California
 3 households, about 13,000 individuals (adults and children), and about 2,000
 4 individuals on Medi-Cal.

5 **LEVELS AND TRENDS IN MIS-REPORTING**

6 Before turning to the more detailed results from the matched data, we
 7 conclude this section with an analysis comparing simple (unmatched)
 8 tabulations from the two data sources (i.e., a comparison of the aggregate
 9 administrative counts and the CPS estimates of the population enrolled).
 10 Figure 2.2 plots the ratio of CPS enrollment to MEDS enrollment. (Table 2.3
 11 provides the underlying numbers.) These tabulations are made using the
 12 individual-level MEDS files. We have aligned the counts to match the CPS
 13 concepts so that enrollment is measured as being at any time in the past year.
 14 Age is as of March of the next year. The division between adults and children
 15 follows the CPS at 14/15 at the interview. California residence in the CPS is
 16 ascribed based on residence a year before the interview (not at the interview,
 17 as is conventionally done).



18 **Figure 2.2—Under-Reporting of Enrollment (CPS/MEDS)**
 19 Source: Tabulations from RAND Merged CPS File and RAND MEDS file

Table 2.3
Reporting Rates (CPS/MEDS)

Survey Year	Adults			Children		
	M	W	MO	M	W	MO
1990	74%	50%	100%	71%	51%	128%
1991	73%	52%	95%	69%	50%	116%
1992	70%	51%	88%	64%	46%	104%
1993	68%	52%	83%	63%	46%	99%
1994	72%	54%	88%	76%	50%	124%
1995	69%	49%	86%	73%	48%	119%
1996	71%	49%	89%	70%	47%	114%
1997	68%	48%	84%	64%	44%	103%
1998	66%	43%	83%	67%	40%	115%
1999	65%	37%	83%	70%	42%	114%
2000	71%	37%	87%	67%	28%	109%

Source: RAND tabulations from RAND CPS matched file and the RAND MEDS file.

Note: M-Medi-Cal, W-Welfare, MO-Medi-Cal Only.

Tabulated according to CPS concepts: Data refers to calendar year preceding the survey year. Enrollment is at any time in calendar year (not in each month); Adults are 15-65 in March of the next year; Children are 0-14 in March of the next year.

As the figure and the table show, there clearly is under-reporting. CPS Medi-Cal counts are only about 70 percent of MEDS Medi-Cal counts. CPS welfare counts are only about 40 percent of MEDS welfare counts. Anomalously, CPS Medi-Cal Only counts are close to MEDS Medi-Cal Only counts. We return to this below.

Unlike the earlier characterization of the national data, there is little evidence of trend in California's Medi-Cal reporting rates. Perhaps there is some increase in Medi-Cal for adults in 1996 and 2000 with the latest changes. There is no evidence of an increase for children in 1996 or 2000; the estimates decline. The situation is very different for welfare. Welfare reporting rates for adults have fallen from about 50 percent to about 40 percent over these eleven years. For children, there is a large additional drop in 2000.

DISCUSSION

This section has provided basic background information. It described the Medi-Cal program and the two data sources. It then compared the two data sources in aggregate to provide a rough characterization of the mis-reporting. In the next section, we turn to the match: what it can contribute and what are the technical issues in using the information provided.

1

3. THE MATCHED DATA

2 In this chapter, we turn to the matched data so that we can investigate
3 mis-reporting at the individual level. In order to understand mis-reporting,
4 we begin by creating and analyzing a dataset containing only the highest-
5 quality matches. In this chapter, we describe the congruence of the CPS
6 responses to the MEDS information, where we treat the MEDS information as
7 "truth."

8 What we are able to report is strongly constrained by Census disclosure
9 rules. To preserve the confidentiality of CPS respondents, those rules limit
10 our ability to report exact results for tables with small cell sizes in any of
11 the cells. Thus, to preserve confidentiality, for most analyses, we pool
12 observations across all of the survey years. In some cases, where the cell
13 sizes are particularly small, we combine cells or report the predictions from
14 simple regression models.

15 As we discuss here and in the next chapter, not everyone provides a SSN,
16 so the matched data cannot provide a complete characterization of the quality
17 of reports. We defer until the next chapter a discussion of how we use the
18 information from the matched sample to make inferences about the entire
19 population—both those who do provide a SSN and those who do not.

20 **MATCHING**

21 Our first task in constructing the matched dataset is to match the
22 administrative data (from the MEDS) to the survey data for California
23 residents (from the CPS) where possible. Table 3.1 summarizes the sample
24 selection rules for the analyses in this chapter. Appendix A describes the
25 matching process, sample selection rules, and results in more detail. We note
26 that we deliberately suppress the exact sample counts in each year to preserve
27 our ability to present other more substantive results by year later in the
28 analysis.

29

1
2

Table 3.1
Sample for Matched Analyses

Sample	Validated	Unvalidated	Total
Adults 15-65			
Initial	46,404	53,515	99,919
No SSN	18,665	18,677	37,342
Movers	1,717	1,169	2,886
Imputed Data	976	1,519	2,495
Bad Match	692	446	1,138
Final	24,354	31,704	56,058
Children, 0-14			
Initial	16,567	20,289	36,856
No Parent	205	251	456
No Parental SSN	6,773	7,595	14,368
Final	9,589	12,443	22,032

3

4 Our primary focus is on "adults" (defined as age 15 to 65 as of the March
5 interview) residing in California. The reason for these two exclusions is
6 straightforward. First, the CPS only collected SSNs for those aged 15 and
7 older, so there is no possibility of matching "children" (defined as those
8 under age 15). Second, the MEDS is administrative data from the state of
9 California and, thus, only includes information on people enrolled in
10 California's Medicaid program, Medi-Cal.

11 The basic sample begins with California adults. Consistent with the CPS
12 questions on program participation that refer to participation in the previous
13 year, we define "California adults" based on state of residence a year prior
14 to the interview.¹³ From this sample of California adults (as of a year prior
15 to the interview), the "matched sample" drops the following groups:

- 16 • No SSN: Even for those age 15 and older, not everyone has a
17 (scrambled) SSN on our internal CPS file.¹⁴

¹³ Using state of residence a year before the survey is more consistent with the CPS reference period than using state of residence at the survey. We note, however, that it does not appear to be standard practice in analyses of program participation or health insurance coverage.

We also note that the CPS reference period induces some standard coverage issues. The sample is drawn in March of the following year and is, therefore, not completely representative of everyone alive in the reference year (or even as of the end of the reference year). The divergence will include births and deaths and changes in residence (in the United States at all, in an institution).

¹⁴ In 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995, and 1996, our file includes "unvalidated SSNs," i.e., the SSNs are simply a scrambled version of the SSN provided by the CPS respondent.

- 1 • *Movers*: Our MEDS data only include welfare receipt in California.
2 So for movers, responses about Medicaid and welfare might refer to
3 enrollment in a different state, which would not be recorded in the
4 MEDS data. For the analysis in this chapter, we therefore also
5 drop movers (i.e., those who were not in California both a year
6 before the survey and at the survey). This is an imperfect
7 adjustment for movers. (See further discussion of this issue at
8 the end of Appendix A.)
- 9 • *Imputed Data*: Imputed data on enrollment is not informative for
10 the quality of unimputed responses. Imputed data on the matching
11 variables might cause us to incorrectly accept or reject a SSN
12 match. (See the next bullet.) We therefore drop from the analyses
13 in this chapter anyone with imputed responses on program enrollment
14 (Medicaid or welfare) and anyone with imputed responses on the
15 basic demographics used in matching (gender and age; there are only
16 a trivial number of such individuals).
- 17 • *Bad SSN*: To accept a match, we require a match on gender and on
18 age plus or minus one year.

19

20 Note that even though we refer to this as our "matched sample," it is
21 more properly the sample of people who *could* have matched to the MEDS (i.e.,
22 they provided a SSN). We do *not* require an actual match to the MEDS because
23 we want to include people in our sample who did not receive Medi-Cal (who may
24 or may not report their program participation correctly in the CPS). Our MEDS
25 extract contains a record for each individual who has received Medi-Cal during
26 1989 to 2001. Individuals who did not receive Medi-Cal during this period

 In 1991, 1994, and 1997-2000, our file includes a validated version of
the SSN, not (a scrambled version of) the SSN provided by the CPS respondent.
Exact details on the validation process are not available, but it appears that
Census provided a list of SSNs and basic demographic information (name,
gender, age) to the Social Security Administration (SSA). SSA then cross-
checked the information against its SSN records. For some cases, a SSN was
imputed onto [into?] the file based on name, place of birth, and birth date;
for other cases, a provided SSN was deleted based on failure to match on these
criteria.

 Some of the tabulations below (including Table 3.1) tabulate results
separately by validation status of the survey file (i.e., the entire year).
To avoid ascribing lack of congruence between CPS and MEDS data to improper
SSNs, other analyses below drop all unvalidated years.

1 should not and will not appear in the MEDS data. We leave them in the matched
2 sample and infer that they never received Medi-Cal. We note, however, that
3 for this group it is not possible to verify that the gender and age match
4 across the two data sources.

5 Finally, the analyses in this chapter consider only the "validated" data
6 in order to generate an analysis file with only the highest quality matches.
7 When the CPS collects SSNs, it also asks permission to "validate" SSNs with
8 the Social Security Administration (SSA). The details of this validation are
9 unclear. It appears that for a respondent who does not provide a SSN, Census
10 passes his/her name, gender, and age to SSA which attempts to impute a SSN
11 from the official SSA SSN files (the NUMIDENT file). Conversely, it also
12 appears that provided SSNs are checked and either replaced or deleted. The
13 presumption is that this validation improves the quality of the matches. In
14 some years (1991, 1994, and 1997-2000), Census provided us with the validated
15 files; in other years (1990, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1996), Census provided us with
16 only the unvalidated files. Presumably, validation improves the quality of
17 the SSNs. Our results below support that presumption.

18 The CPS's failure to collect SSNs for children implies that we cannot
19 directly apply similar matching methods to children. In the substantive
20 analyses below, we make a rough imputation of the implications of our analysis
21 of the matched data for children and, therefore, for the entire population.
22 To do so, we assume that if the family's reference person (as identified by
23 the CPS FAMREL variable) is actually enrolled in Medi-Cal/welfare, the
24 children are as well. However, if the family's reference person is not
25 enrolled in Medi-Cal/welfare, we do not use that information to impute
26 enrollment for the child. Table 3.1 also gives the total number of California
27 children and the number of them whose reference person is in the matched
28 sample.

29 The net effect of these sample restrictions is that although the CPS has
30 99,919 California adults during the period 1990 to 2000, our narrow matched
31 sample for data quality analysis is only a quarter of that, 24,354. Only six
32 of the eleven years are validated, cutting our sample nearly in half. Only
33 about 65 percent of the validated sample provides SSNs, about 2 percent of the
34 sample in California a year before the survey is not in California at the
35 survey, about 3 percent of the sample has imputed data, and about 1 percent is
36 a "bad match."

1 For our analyses of CPS data quality, we will use these narrowly
2 defined/highest quality matches. For our extrapolations to the full file, we
3 will use all the matches, making multivariate corrections for the effects of
4 validation (see the discussion of details in the next chapter). As expected,
5 we note that validation both increases the fraction of adults with SSNs (from
6 60 percent to 65 percent). However, the bad match rate nearly doubles with
7 validation (from 0.8 percent to 1.5 percent). Apparently, some of the SSNs
8 added at validation are incorrect.

9 Based on our descriptive analysis, providing a SSN does not appear to be
10 random (see Table 3.2). More advantaged people are more likely to provide a
11 SSN and to appear in the final sample; less advantaged people are less likely
12 to provide a SSN and be in the final sample. Combining the validated and
13 unvalidated samples, we tabulate the fraction of people with given
14 characteristics in the final (i.e., matched) sample. This is a rough proxy
15 for presence of a SSN; about 85 percent of those in the full sample, but not
16 in the final sample, are dropped because of a missing SSN. Overall, 58
17 percent of adults are in the final sample; i.e., provide a SSN, are not
18 movers, do not have imputed data, and are not "bad matches," (These figures
19 are weighted, unlike those in Table 3.1, which are unweighted). Minorities
20 (black and Hispanic, 50 percent), high school drop-outs (51 percent), and
21 those in poverty –less than half the poverty line (45 percent), half the
22 poverty line to the poverty line (52 percent), the poverty line to one and a
23 half times the poverty line (52 percent), and one and a half times the poverty
24 line to twice the poverty line 54 percent)–and single females with children
25 (54 percent) are less likely to be in the final sample. Those with at least
26 some college (63 percent) and other health insurance (63 percent) are more
27 likely to provide a SSN.

1
2

Table 3.2
Percentage of People from Full Sample in Final Sample

<u>Sample</u>	<u>% w/SSN</u>
Overall	58%
Male	58%
Hispanic	50%
Black	50%
HS Drop Out	51%
Some College	63%
FPL<0.5	52%
0.5<FPL<1.0	52%
1.0<FPP<1.5	52%
1.5<FPP<2.0	54%
Kids in Household	57%
Single Female w/Kids	54%
Other Health Insurance	63%
Welfare	65%
Medicaid	55%

3

Note: FPL—Federal Poverty Line.

4 Given that they are less socially advantaged, we might expect those
5 enrolled in Medi-Cal to be less likely to provide a SSN. Offsetting this,
6 Medi-Cal enrollees are required to supply a SSN each time they deal with the
7 welfare office, so they are likely to know their SSN, and perhaps be less
8 reluctant to give it out. In fact, those reporting to the CPS that they have
9 welfare are more likely than others to provide a SSN (63 percent); those
10 reporting to the CPS that they are enrolled in Medi-Cal are as likely as those
11 not reporting Medi-Cal to provide a SSN (58 percent); and those with Medi-Cal
12 only are less likely than others to provide a SSN (55 percent).

13 Combining both the validated and unvalidated years, our basic sample has
14 36,856 children. For almost all of them, we can locate a parent on the file.
15 For about 61 percent of those parents, we have a SSN. This rate is similar to
16 the 63 percent of adults that provide a SSN.

17 **SIMPLE REPORTING RATES**

18 We have deliberately constructed this sample to maximize the congruence
19 between the survey data and the administrative data. We have distinguished
20 between validated and unvalidated SSNs; we have required that gender and age
21 match across the survey data and the administrative data; we have dropped all
22 imputed data; and we have dropped all movers.

23 Furthermore, we have used the administrative data to exactly mimic the
24 CPS concept of program participation—Medi-Cal or welfare in any month in the
25 previous calendar year (January to December). While the CPS data refer to the

1 previous year, aggregate Medicaid and welfare tabulations from administrative
 2 data are usually published as monthly totals. With movement onto and off
 3 Medicaid/welfare, there is no direct relation between the counts for the
 4 individual months and CPS concept—the total number of individuals enrolled in
 5 the program at any point in a given calendar year.

6 This difference in concepts of participation is not an issue in our
 7 analysis. We have the monthly MEDS data and can tabulate it so that it
 8 exactly corresponds to the CPS question (i.e., any Medi-Cal in the previous
 9 calendar year, any welfare in the previous calendar year, and—for Medi-Cal
 10 Only—Medi-Cal, but no welfare in the previous calendar year).

11 From these ideal data, we want to compute “behavioral” mis-reporting
 12 rates (in contrast to the “imputational rates” that we define in the next
 13 chapter). Formally, the mis-reporting rates are:

$$14 \quad \rho_{FP}^b = \frac{FP}{TN + FP} \quad \rho_{FN}^b = \frac{FN}{TP + FN}$$

15 On the left we have the behavioral false positive rate. The denominator is
 16 all people who are not truly enrolled, the sum of true negatives and false
 17 positives. The numerator is the number of people who are not enrolled, but
 18 report that they are. Thus, the ratio is the fraction of people who are not
 19 enrolled, who report falsely that they are. On the right is the behavioral
 20 false negative rate. By analogy, it is the fraction of people who are
 21 enrolled (i.e., the sum of true positives and false negatives), who falsely
 22 report that they are not enrolled. The observed net under-reporting suggests
 23 that the false negatives are the more common group.

24 Table 3.3 reports these behavioral rates. The off-diagonals give the
 25 false reporting rates; i.e., the percentage of people truly in a given status,
 26 who give each possible response. Despite our efforts to develop a sample that
 27 should maximize the congruence between the survey and administrative data, the
 28 congruence of the two reports is distressingly poor, as can be seen in Table
 29 3.3. We perform the analysis separately for each of the three programs of
 30 interest: Any Medi-Cal, welfare, and Medi-Cal only (i.e., Medi-Cal, but not
 31 welfare). There are eight possible outcomes for each individual, which are
 32 summarized in Table 3.3 below: Four outcomes for people for whom there is a
 33 corresponding MEDS record; two possible responses for people with a valid SSN,
 34 but for whom there is no corresponding MEDS record (CPS response is yes or no
 35 and their MEDS responses are implicitly “no”); and two possible CPS responses

1 for those who do not provide a SSN (no information can be gleaned in terms of
2 a MEDS response).

3 **Table 3.3**
4 **Congruence in the Matched Sample**
5 **between MEDS and CPS Data**

		CPS			
		N	MO	W	T
MEDS	N	97.7%	1.8%	0.5%	89.8%
	MO	36.8%	59.3%	3.9%	4.9%
	W	20.4%	32.0%	47.6%	5.3%
	T	90.6%	6.2%	3.2%	100.0%

6 Notes: Entries: row percents (i.e.,
7 rows sum to 100%), except for last row and
8 column ("T" for total) that give overall
9 percentages. Computed from the "matched
10 sample" (i.e., adults who provide a SSN).

11 N-No Medi-Cal, MO-Medi-Cal Only, W-
12 Welfare, T-Total.

13 Then, the first column of Table 3.3 suggests that few people who do not
14 have Medi-Cal report that they do have Medi-Cal (2.3 percent = 100.0 percent -
15 97.7 percent). The same is not true for those with Medi-Cal. Less than two-
16 thirds (59.3 percent) of those with Medi-Cal Only actually report having Medi-
17 Cal Only in the CPS (i.e., Medi-Cal, but not welfare); and less than half
18 (47.6 percent) of those with welfare actually report having welfare in the
19 CPS. These are distressingly low rates of congruence, particularly in a
20 sample designed to only include the highest quality matches.

21 The overall congruence of reports of Medi-Cal is higher. Nearly three-
22 quarters of those with Medi-Cal report that they have Medi-Cal (computed from
23 the second and third rows of Table 3.2 by converting to the unconditional
24 percentages, combining the Medi-Cal Only and Welfare groups and computed error
25 rates). This divergence appears to be explained by those with welfare. While
26 more than half of them report not having welfare (52.4 percent), most of them
27 do report having Medi-Cal. Thus, the overall reporting of Medi-Cal is not as
28 bad as considering welfare and Medi-Cal-Only separately would suggest. This
29 also appears to explain why the raw reporting rates for Medi-Cal Only (i.e.,
30 the ratio of the CPS counts to the MEDS counts; see Table 2.3) are so much
31 higher than the reporting rates for Medi-Cal or Welfare. It is not that
32 reporting rates are higher for Medi-Cal Only; it is that many of those
33 reporting Medi-Cal only in the CPS actually have welfare as well.

1 The implications of Table 3.2 for reporting rates are relatively subtle.
2 The previous paragraph considered reports conditional on the truth (as
3 recorded in the MEDS). Some of the errors are offsetting. If instead, we
4 compare the gross rates (i.e., the ratio of the CPS total to the MEDS total),
5 the reporting rates are higher. The gross reporting rate for Medi-Cal is 92
6 percent $((6.2\%+3.2\%)/(4.9\%+5.3\%))$. The gross reporting rate for welfare is
7 much lower at 60 percent $(3.2\%/5.3\%)$. For Medi-Cal Only, the gross reporting
8 rate implies over-reporting of Medi-Cal Only at 128 percent $(6.2\%/4.9\%)$.

9 These gross reporting rates in the validated years are higher than for
10 the unmatched comparisons that implicitly include both the matched and
11 unmatched samples (about 70 percent of Medi-Cal, about 45 percent for welfare,
12 and about 85 percent for Medi-Cal Only). Thus, while the matched data capture
13 some of the under-reporting, it seems likely that there are additional
14 considerations leading to under-reporting in the unmatched sample. The
15 simplest explanation is higher false negative rates; people who do not provide
16 a SSN are more likely to not report enrollment, even when they are enrolled.
17 Below, we implement an algorithm consistent with that simple explanation.


18 Other explanations would consider not differential reporting, but
19 differential coverage of the CPS. Even if the CPS survey process was perfect,
20 the CPS only attempts to interview those in the non-institutional population.
21 Anyone receiving Medi-Cal and in an institution would be in the MEDS count,
22 but not in the CPS count. To address this concern, we delete everyone over 65
23 from both counts. This should eliminate most of the institutionalized
24 population. The size of the remaining institutionalized population is
25 unclear.

26 Similarly, while the CPS sampling frame is the non-institutionalized
27 population, as with any survey, some people are missed. The CPS adjusts for
28 such failure to interview using control totals derived from the Census that
29 stratify on region, gender, and age. It seems likely, that within these
30 cells, those with Medi-Cal are less likely to be interviewed. If this
31 supposition is correct, then the CPS, even with adjustments, will under-report
32 Medi-Cal enrollment. Again, the methods we propose below will correct for
33 this weighting error, at least at the aggregate level.

1 **UNDERSTANDING THE REPORTING ERRORS**

2 Table 3.3 tabulates the MEDS data according to whether there was any
3 program enrollment in the previous year. Standard cognitive approaches to
4 survey response (Sudman and Bradburn, 1973; Groves, 1989) would suggest that a
5 positive Medi-Cal response is more likely the more Medi-Cal/welfare receipt
6 there was and also if there is Medi-Cal receipt in the survey month.

7 Our detailed MEDS data allow us to compute months of enrollment last year
8 and enrollment in March of this year. The observation counts at each month
9 are too small to allow reporting the raw rates. Instead for Medi-Cal, Figure
10 3.1 reports: (1) the raw rates for March of this year, and all of last year;
11 and (2) not March of this year and none of last year. For the other
12 combinations, we report the results of probit polynomial regressions.¹⁵
13 Reporting the regression results also smoothes out some of the sampling
14 variation.




15 **Figure 3.1—CPS Reporting of Medi-Cal Given MEDS Pattern of Receipt**

16 ¹⁵ The probit analysis takes as its dependent variable the percentage of
17 people reporting enrollment from the MEDS, given their actual status in March
of the survey year (i.e., the vertical axis of Figure 3.1) and as its
independent variables polynomials in months of actual enrollment from the MEDS
(i.e., the vertical axis of Figure 3.1). The polynomial is quadratic for
those on welfare this March and linear for those not on welfare this March.
The analysis uses the CPS sample weights. We then plot the predicted
probabilities from that model.

1 If reporting was perfect, the points for "0" would be zero and the other
2 points would be 100 percent. Instead, we observe a clear dose-response
3 relationship. The more months of enrollment last year recorded in the MEDS,
4 the more likely a person is to report program enrollment in the CPS. People
5 on Medi-Cal all of last year and in March of this year, report Medi-Cal at
6 about 85 percent. People on in March, but not on all of the previous year,
7 are less likely to report Medi-Cal, with reporting rates varying from 30 to 70
8 percent.

9 The CPS question only asks about enrollment last year, but enrollment in
10 March clearly affects the probability of answering the CPS question about last
11 year positively. The difference ranges from 15 to 30 percentage points.
12 Finally, note that people enrolled in March but not at all last year—who
13 should answer negatively—have a 20 percent probability of answering in the
14 affirmative (i.e., they respond based on their current enrollment status
15 rather than their enrollment status last year). These people appear to
16 explain much of the false positives, people who report enrollment in the CPS
17 but who are not actually enrolled (in the past year) according to the MEDS.

18 Figure 3.2 reports the same tabulations and probit regression predictions
19 for welfare. The patterns are similar. People enrolled in March are more
20 likely to respond positively. Even some (about 5 percent) of those enrolled
21 in March, but not last year, respond positively, comprising many of the false
22 positives. Both for those enrolled in March and for those not enrolled in
23 March, a positive response is more likely the more months of enrollment in the
24 past year. However, even for people enrolled in March and all of last year,
25 only slightly more than half report their welfare participation in the CPS.



1
2 **Figure 3.2—CPS Reporting of Welfare Given MEDS Pattern of Receipt**

3 The CPS also includes a question about months of receipt of Medicaid and
4 welfare last year; however, the individual cells are too sparse to allow
5 reporting. We do find that there is some correlation between the MEDS and CPS
6 data, but the correlation is only moderate (0.58 for Medi-Cal, 0.57 for
7 welfare) and the mean numbers of months reported are very different.
8 Consequently, we conclude that the monthly data are not very useful.

9 Some of the other welfare false positives, people who report to the CPS
10 that they received welfare last year but who are not recorded as having
11 welfare in the administrative data (i.e., the MEDS), are also understandable.
12 The CPS distinguishes between AFDC/TANF/CalWORKs (a state program) and SSI (a
13 federal program). Both programs provide cash and both automatically confer
14 Medi-Cal eligibility. Thus, it would not be surprising if some people on SSI
15 report to the CPS that they are on welfare. We would code those people as
16 "false positives." Because SSI confers Medi-Cal eligibility, we can identify
17 SSI in MEDS and, therefore, in the matched data. Tabulations on the validated
18 years suggest that a sizable fraction of the welfare false positives in fact
19 have SSI. Cell counts are too small to support more precise estimates or
20 their release. Even with these explanations, some of the welfare false
21 positives are still unexplained. Based on these results for SSI, however, it

1 seems likely that some of the remaining false positives are related to receipt
2 of General Relief (which we can not identify in our data).

3 Unfortunately, we cannot use similar methods to better understand the
4 false positive reports for Medi-Cal, because we do not have similar
5 administrative data that identify other sources of public insurance. By
6 analogy to the results for welfare, however, it seems likely that some other
7 public health insurance programs are being reported as Medicaid, again
8 inducing false positive responses. For example, in California, Healthy
9 Families is administered outside the Medicaid system and not recorded in MEDS.
10 Thus, some of the Medi-Cal Only false positives are probably Healthy Families
11 enrollees. However, given that we have dropped everyone under age 15 and
12 Healthy Families in California does not cover adults, this is unlikely to be a
13 major factor. More recently, several counties have put in place public,
14 county-level Medicaid-like programs. Although these programs were implemented
15 after the period our data cover and, thus, cannot explain the false positives
16 in our data, this may be an issue in future CPS interviews, where such
17 programs may incorrectly be reported as Medicaid.

18 Another possible explanation for the false positives in both of the
19 programs is migration between states. As we discuss in detail at the end of
20 Appendix A, we control for migration, but those controls are incomplete. For
21 example, some people who we have classified as California residents in fact
22 spent part of the reference year in another state. If they were enrolled in
23 Medicaid/welfare there, we would have incorrectly labeled them as false
24 positives.

25 We note, in contrast, that the false negative rates (i.e., the percent of
26 people enrolled in the program based on the MEDS that do not report
27 participation in the CPS) seem much too high to be explained away by any of
28 these factors.

29 **CPS REFERENCE PERIOD**

30 Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 suggest that enrollment in the following March
31 increases the probability of a positive response. Of particular note are the
32 people who were not enrolled at any point during the last year, but are
33 enrolled in March of this year. They should give a negative response to a
34 question about enrollment last year. For Medi-Cal, about 20 percent of this
35 group gives a positive response; for welfare the comparable figure is about 5

1 percent. These percentages are about half of the percentages for people
2 enrolled in March of this year, but only enrolled one month of the previous
3 year. These results are consistent with Swartz (1986) and Sudman, Bradburn,
4 and Schwarz (1996) who argue that the CPS responses should be interpreted as
5 referring not to the previous calendar year, but instead to the interview
6 month. CBO seems to accept this argument (Bilheimer, 1997; CBO, 2003).
7 Lewis, Ellwood, and Cazjka's (1998, p. 27) in their review conclude:

8
9 The CPS is designed to measure the number of individuals uninsured
10 throughout a given year. Yet most researchers believe the CPS
11 estimates of the uninsured represent a mix of those uninsured
12 *throughout* [emphasis in the original] the previous year and those
13 uninsured at a point in time [i.e., as of the interview].
14

15 Interpreting the CPS responses as referring, not to the previous year, but
16 instead to the interview month would in general yield both lower Medi-Cal
17 enrollment rates (fewer people are enrolled in a given month than in an entire
18 year) and higher uninsurance rates (fewer people are uninsured in an entire
19 year than in a given month).¹⁶

20 A more in depth analysis of this issue provides additional evidence to
21 support this argument. For Medi-Cal and welfare, we explore this question
22 directly. We divide our sample into four groups, by their true (i.e., MEDS)
23 enrollment status in the survey month (yes/no) crossed with their true
24 enrollment status in the previous year (yes/no). Our interest focuses on the
25 cases where the status last year diverges from the status at the interview.
26 In that case, the question is whether people are more likely to respond with
27 their status last year (i.e., what the CPS instructions call for) or their
28 status as of the interview (i.e., the cognitively simpler task). For the
29 matched sample, Table 3.4 reports the prevalence of each cell in the MEDS and
30 the probability of an affirmative response. The table has two implications.
31 First, the overwhelming share of people have the same outcome last year and in
32 the survey month. Thus, using the wrong reference period is unlikely to
33 explain much of the net under-reporting.

¹⁶ See Bennefield (1996b) who argues that the problem is generic under-reporting because of the length of the recall period. See also Fronstin, 1996, on dual coverage; Kronick, 1991, on private health insurance; Beauregard et al., 1997, comparing to MEPS results; Bennefield, 1996c, using CPS experimental questions; and Long and Marquis, 1996, comparing to RWJF survey.

1 Second, among those who do not have the same outcome last year and in the
 2 survey month, the more common response is "no." Specifically, consider people
 3 enrolled last year, but not at the interview (i.e., rows C and D). The
 4 "correct" response is "yes"/last year (i.e., row D), but "no"/survey month
 5 (i.e., row C) is more than twice as common (for Medi-Cal 1.56% vs. 0.58%; for
 6 Welfare 1.16% vs. 0.36%). Alternatively, consider people enrolled at the
 7 interview, but not last year (i.e., rows E and F). The correct response is
 8 "no"/last year (i.e., row E). Compared to "yes"/survey month, it is five
 9 times more common for Medi-Cal (0.43% vs. 0.08%) and essentially no one gives
 10 the correct response for welfare.

11 The net effect is to induce too many false negatives. For Medi-Cal the
 12 net effect is slightly less than one percentage point ($0.89=(1.56-0.58)+(0.43-$
 13 $0.08)$). For welfare, the net effect is slightly more than one percentage
 14 point ($1.33=(1.16-0.46)+(0.19-0.00)$).

15 In terms of whether the reference period is more usefully viewed as the
 16 survey month or the previous year, the two effects approximately net out,
 17 yielding a small net effect. For Medi-Cal the net effect is about half a
 18 percentage point towards survey month over previous year ($0.63=(1.56-$
 19 $0.58)+(0.08-0.43)$). For welfare, the net effect is about half a percentage
 20 point towards survey month over previous year ($0.51=(1.16-0.46)+(0.00-0.19)$).
 21 Overall, the net effect is just too small to explain the large differences
 22 that are seen across the two data sets.

23
 24

Table 3.4
CPS Reference Period

	MEDS Response		CPS Response	Medi- Cal	Welfare
	Any Time Last Year	Survey Month			
A	Y	Y	N	6.85%	1.91%
B	Y	Y	Y	1.80%	1.91%
C	Y	N	N	1.56%	1.16%
D	Y	N	Y	0.58%	0.46%
E	N	Y	N	0.43%	0.19%
F	N	Y	Y	0.08%	0.00%
G	N	N	N	86.71%	93.81%
H	N	N	Y	1.99%	0.56%

25 Notes: Cells are percent responding enrolled in the
 26 program in the CPS given enrolled last year and/or
 27 enrolled in survey month (from the MEDS). Validated
 28 years only. Final row is net impact of last year versus
 29 survey month; entry greater than one implies last year is
 30 more important (as per CPS instructions). Computed from
 31 validated years only.

1 **TIME TRENDS**

2 The previous analyses have pooled results across the (validated) years
3 for which we have matched data. However, two factors suggest the importance
4 of studying change over time. First, based on the aggregate data there is
5 some evidence of increases over time in under-reporting. Second, the Census
6 Bureau has altered the CPS questions, most notably in 1996 and 2000, which
7 appears to have increased reports of health insurance coverage.

8 Unfortunately, the matched samples in each year are small, about 5,000
9 adults per year. Medi-Cal enrollment rates average about 10 percent, about
10 500 people in the CPS; welfare and Medi-Cal only rates are about half that.
11 Furthermore, false positives are rare, often a few percent or less. As a
12 result, we cannot provide descriptive evidence on time trends in the
13 probability of false positives and false negatives. The multivariate analyses
14 described below, however, do provide some evidence on this issue.

15 **"BEHAVIORAL REGRESSIONS" AND "IMPUTATIONAL REGRESSIONS"**

16 Clearly from both a statistical perspective and a disclosure perspective,
17 the sample sizes are only barely large enough to support contingency table
18 analyses. Furthermore, we would like to understand how reporting has shifted
19 over time and the potential effects of the changes in the CPS questions, most
20 notably those in 1996 and 2000. Appendix A reports a total of 48 regressions:

- 21
- 22 • **Three outcomes:** Medi-Cal, welfare, Medi-Cal Only;
 - 23 • **Four concepts:** Behavioral false negatives (the probability of
24 answering "not enrolled" in the CPS, given that the MEDS indicates
25 enrollment); behavioral false positives (the probability of
26 answering "enrolled" in the CPS, given that the MEDS indicated not
27 enrolled); imputational false negatives (the probability of being
28 enrolled according to the MEDS, given answering "not enrolled" in
29 the CPS); and imputational false positive (the probability of not
30 being enrolled in the MEDS, given answering "enrolled" in the CPS).
31 (See below for a discussion of the distinction between behavioral
32 and imputational regressions.)
 - 33 • **Four stepwise-regression specifications:** All the variables in the
34 "levels," a pruned set of variables in the levels, interactions for

1 all the variables included in the levels, and a pruned set of
2 variables in the interactions.

3

4 Appendix A provides details of the variable specifications, the stepwise
5 strategy, and the regression coefficients.

6 These results are crucial for the imputation models that follow, but they
7 are otherwise difficult to interpret. Crucially for our purposes, they
8 confirm the aggregate data and show no trend in the imputation false negatives
9 for Medi-Cal but confirm a strong increase in false negatives for welfare.
10 This is consistent with the tabulations from the unmatched data in Table 2.2.

11 **CPS IMPUTATIONS**

12 The previous analyses in this chapter have used what we called the
13 matched sample. To ensure that any lack of congruence resulted from true
14 response errors, we deleted all imputed data from the analysis.

15 However, we can and did perform the match for all people for whom a SSN
16 was available. We will use this sample to analyze the quality of CPS
17 imputation of program participation. As in the main analysis, we drop those
18 without SSNs, apparently bad matches, and movers. Table 3.5 reports the
19 congruence of the MEDS data and CPS imputed responses. The table has three
20 panels. The first panel considers what the Census refers to as "allocation"
21 of welfare (i.e., imputation for item non-response). This allocation is done
22 by the standard Census hot-deck procedure. Similarly, the second panel
23 considers the "allocation" of Medicaid responses for item non-response.
24 Finally, the third panel considers logical imputation of Medicaid. The CPS
25 automatically imputes Medicaid to anyone who reports the receipt of welfare or
26 SSI.

1
2

Table 3.5
MEDS Data for CPS Imputed Records

CPS Value	MEDS Data		
	No	Yes	Total
Welfare Allocated			
No	93.96%	2.85%	96.82%
Yes	0.66%	2.52%	3.18%
	94.63%	5.37%	100.00%
Medi-Cal Allocated			
No	56.00%	30.27%	86.28%
Yes	6.24%	7.48%	13.72%
	62.24%	37.76%	100.0%
Medi-Cal Logically Imputed			
Yes	51.20%	48.80%	100.0%
Total	51.20%	48.80%	100.0%

3
4
5

Note: Cells are percent within the panel.
Verified years only.

6 Because the CPS does not impute for program participation for many
7 people, the sample sizes for the estimates presented in Table 3.5 are small
8 (about 100 cases are imputed over all of our data). Consequently, these
9 results need to be treated with caution. With that caveat, the results
10 suggest that the hot-deck algorithm is under-estimating program enrollment.
11 For welfare, the difference is small. The MEDS suggests that about 5.37
12 percent of the allocated cases are enrolled; the Census imputes welfare to
13 only 3.18 percent of them. For Medi-Cal the differences are larger. In MEDS,
14 37.76 percent of the cases are enrolled in Medi-Cal whereas the CPS imputes
15 only 13.72 percent.

16 The logical imputations add Medicaid to children whose parents report
17 Medicaid. For older children, we can check this imputation against the MEDS.
18 We find that only 38.80 percent (partially imputed to Medi-Cal) actually have
19 Medi-Cal. The imputation is making things worse.

20 In the matched sample, the logical imputations are about two percent of
21 all cases and the allocations about one percent of all cases. Relative to
22 perfect imputations, the incorrect logical imputations therefore raise the
23 Medi-Cal enrollment rate by about one percentage point. Relative to perfect
24 imputations, the incorrect allocations lower the Medi-Cal enrollment rate by
25 about a fifth of a percentage point.

26 For welfare, they represent less than a fifth of a percentage point. The
27 effect on overall enrollments of any imputation errors is therefore trivial.
28 In fact, the imputations of welfare participation appear to be quite good.

1 These results suggest that people who do not answer the Medicaid
2 questions are substantially more likely to have Medicaid/Medi-Cal than the
3 demographically similar households the CPS hot-deck procedure is using for its
4 imputations. In short, item non-response is not random, but the effect on
5 total estimated enrollment is trivial. In contrast, the Medicaid logical
6 imputations are wrong about half the time, increasing estimated Medi-Cal
7 enrollment by about one percentage point, which is about ten percent of true
8 Medi-Cal enrollment. Some additional attention to the Medicaid logical
9 imputations may be appropriate.

10 **CONCLUSION**

11 This chapter has considered congruence between the CPS and MEDS data in
12 the best possible matching sample. Even in this sample, the level of
13 congruence is distressingly low and appears to be getting worse over time for
14 welfare.

15

1

4. EXTRAPOLATING TO THE FULL DATA

2 The previous chapter analyzed the congruence of responses among those who
3 provided a SSN (what we referred to as the matched sample) and met a set of
4 sample inclusion criteria. However, as Table 3.1 notes, many people do not
5 provide a SSN. Furthermore, not providing a SSN is differential. People who
6 are more disadvantaged are less likely to provide a SSN, but people who are on
7 welfare are slightly more likely to provide a SSN.

8 The basic problem that is addressed in this chapter is that we do not
9 have SSNs for about half of the sample. We do not want to assume that the
10 responses in the unmatched sample are perfect. Instead, we want to use
11 information from the reporting errors in the matched sample (where we have the
12 MEDS information, treated as truth) to perform better imputations of program
13 enrollment in the unmatched sample. The basic idea is that individuals with
14 characteristics associated with under-reporting in the matched sample are more
15 likely to under-report in the unmatched sample. We estimate a logistic
16 regression model of such reporting errors (both under-reporting and over-
17 reporting) on the matched sample. We then use that model to multiply impute a
18 true response in the unmatched sample; where by multiple imputation we mean
19 that we assign a probability of each response to each individual based on the
20 regression model.

21 In practice, we have one more piece of information. We can estimate the
22 total number of people in the unmatched sample who are enrolled in a program.
23 To do so, we take the total estimates from the administrative data and
24 subtract the estimates of enrollment in the matched sample (i.e., we use the
25 CPS weights and the MEDS/administrative data information). Our logistic
26 regression models in general under-predict the number of program enrollees in
27 the matched sample. We therefore append a multiplicative adjustment factor.
28 The effect of that adjustment factor is to force the imputed number of program
29 enrollees to exactly match the administrative totals.

30 The balance of this chapter provides a precise mathematical discussion of
31 the problem and our approach. The discussion in this chapter is extremely
32 formal and technical. Many readers will want to skip to the next chapter
33 where we provide the substantive results.

34

1 **THE IDENTIFICATION PROBLEM**

2 We can conceptualize the CPS matching problem as a table including eight
 3 "cells," in terms of total weighted counts. The columns distinguish whether
 4 the individual is on the program according to the MEDS (i.e., YES/NO). The
 5 rows distinguish both the CPS response and whether the record has a SSN (so it
 6 is potentially matchable). The letters name the cells to ease the discussion
 7 below.

8

		MEDS			
		YES	NO	Total	
CPS	SSN	YES	A=TP _S	B=FP _S	C=Y _S
		NO	D=FN _S	E=TN _S	F=N _S
	Absent	YES	G=TP _A	H=FP _A	I=Y _A
		NO	J=FN _A	K=TN _A	L=N _A
		Total	M=Y _M	N=N _M	O=T

9

10 Thus, the subscripts are:

- 11 • "S"—SSN present (i.e., a match was in principle possible; in
 12 practice, we drop the bad matches as well);
- 13 • "A"—SSN absent (i.e., a match is not possible);
- 14 • "M"—MEDS.

15

16 And the other codes are:

- 17 • TP—true positive;
- 18 • TN—true negative;
- 19 • FN—false negative;
- 20 • FP—false positive.

21

22 And finally:

- 23 • Y—"Yes" (on Medi-Cal/welfare);
- 24 • N—"No" (not on Medi-Cal/welfare);
- 25 • T—Total.

26

27 We treat the MEDS data as "truth." Thus, our goal is to use the MEDS
 28 data to "fix" the CPS data. From the records that provided SSNs, we know TP_S,
 29 FP_S, FN_S, and TN_S. So, we simply adjust the CPS answers to align with the MEDS
 30 answers.

31 The challenge therefore is the unmatchable data—those records for which
 32 no SSN was available in the CPS. There, we only know the row totals—Y_A, N_{A,-}

1 and the column totals by subtraction from the "S" sample $TP_A + FN_A = Y_M - TP_S - FN_S$ and
 2 $FP_A - TN_A = Y_M - FP_S - TN_S$. However, there is some additional—we will see, not quite
 3 enough—information from the matched sample.

4 To understand our approach, begin by formally defining the *imputational*
 5 *false positive rate* and the *imputational false negative rate* as:

$$6 \quad (4.1) \quad \rho_{FP}^i = \frac{FP_S}{TP_S + FP_S} \quad \rho_{FN}^i = \frac{FN_S}{TN_S + FN_S}$$

7 where the "i" is for imputation and these are the rates with respect to the
 8 CPS answers (as opposed to the behavioral rates in terms of the true behavior
 9 as measured in the MEDS that we also considered in the previous chapter).

10 These imputational rates are in contrast to the behavioral rates of the
 11 previous chapter. The tabulations there addressed the behavioral question.
 12 Given the true status, what is the probability of a false response? This is
 13 not a useful concept for imputation. In the CPS, we observe the potential
 14 false response and want to infer the true status. To do so, we want the
 15 imputational rates, i.e., the probability that the true status is different
 16 than the observed response, given the observed response. The two sets of
 17 rates are exactly related. From a complete 2x2 contingency table (i.e., TP,
 18 FP, TN, FN), we can compute both sets of rates. From one set of marginals and
 19 one set of rates, we can recover the other set of rates. Which rate is more
 20 insightful depends on whether we are addressing behavioral questions (as in
 21 the last chapter) or imputational questions (as in this chapter).

22 Then, if we knew these imputational error rates, we could
 23 probabilistically impute the data. We would create two pseudo-observations
 24 for each observation (dividing the sample weight between the pseudo-
 25 observations). So, for example, if an observation reported "Y" in the CPS,
 26 that observation would be assigned a "Y" with probability $1 - \rho_{FP}^i$ and "N" with
 27 probability ρ_{FP}^i . Similarly, if an observation reported "N" in the CPS, that
 28 observation would be assigned a "N" with probability $1 - \rho_{FN}^i$ and a "Y" with
 29 probability ρ_{FN}^i .

30 We do not know these rates in the unmatched sample. Furthermore, the
 31 rates from the matched data are not directly applicable in the unmatched data.
 32 If the rates from the matched sample applied in the unmatched sample, then
 33 applying those rates to the unmatched data would recover the actual number of
 34 people on Medi-Cal/welfare in the MEDS, i.e.:

$$35 \quad (4.2) \quad Y_M = TP_S + FN_S + Y_A (1 - \rho_{FP}^i) + N_A$$

1 However, we have already noted that the under-reporting in the matched sample
2 is not large enough to explain the under-reporting in the full sample.

3 We have a fundamental non-identification problem: One equation for Y_M
4 and two unknowns—the rates in the unmatched data. Setting one of the rates
5 fixes the other rate.

6 Given that in net we have under-reporting of Medi-Cal/welfare and false
7 positives are rare (and relatively stable through time), we adopt the simplest
8 rule. We use the false positive rate from the matched data in the unmatched
9 data. We then adjust the false negative rate (by a multiplicative factor,
10 “ α ”) until the implied total count of people on Medi-Cal/welfare in the CPS
11 equals the count in the MEDS (assumed to be truth).

$$12 \quad (4.3) \quad Y_M = TP_S + FN_S + Y_A(1 - \rho_{FP}^i) + N_A\alpha$$

13 The left-hand side is the “true” number of individuals on Medi-Cal/welfare
14 from the MEDS. The right-hand side is the “fixed” number of individuals on
15 Medi-Cal/welfare in the CPS. Considering each of those terms in turn:

16

- 17 • $TP_S + FN_S$: The number of people who have Medi-Cal/welfare in the
18 matched sample (true positives plus false negatives).
- 19 • $Y_A(1 - \rho_{FP}^i)$: The number of people who report having Medi-
20 Cal/welfare who actually do. We know the number of people who
21 report having Medi-Cal/welfare in the unmatched sample. We
22 estimate the number of these people who actually do have Medi-
23 Cal/welfare using the imputational false positive rate from the
24 matched sample. This is the identifying assumption.
- 25 • $N_A\alpha$: The number of people who report not having Medi-Cal/welfare
26 who actually do. Again, we know the number of people who report
27 not having Medi-Cal/welfare in the unmatched sample. Finally, α
28 gives the probability of a false negative in the unmatched data.

29 Solving for α , the false negative rate in the unmatched sample yields:

$$30 \quad (4.4) \quad \alpha = \frac{Y_M - TP_S - FN_S - Y_A(1 - \rho_{FP}^i)}{N_A}$$

31 Except for the false positive rate, each of the terms on the right side is
32 observable. In the numerator, the first term in parentheses is the number of
33 people on Medi-Cal/welfare from the MEDS. The second and third terms are the
34 number of people on Medi-Cal/welfare from the MEDS in the matched sample. The
35 fourth term is the product of the number of number of people in the unmatched

1 sample who claim to have Medi-Cal/welfare. The denominator is the (weighted)
 2 number of people in the CPS sample who do not provide a SSN who claim not to
 3 have Medi-Cal/welfare. The false positive rates for the unmatched data are
 4 not observed, but by assumption we use the value estimated from the CPS.
 5 Since the CPS is a sample, each of these concepts should be weighted.¹⁷

6 IMPUTING THE DATA

7 This analysis of identification suggests that we are missing one piece of
 8 information. However, once we assume that the false positive rate is common
 9 in the matched sample and the unmatched sample, we can solve for α . Then,
 10 knowing α is enough to solve for each of the cells:

$$\begin{aligned}
 TP_A &= Y_A(1 - \rho_{FP}^i) \\
 FP_A &= Y_A \rho_{FP}^i \\
 FN_A &= N_A \alpha \\
 TN_A &= N_A(1 - \alpha)
 \end{aligned}$$

11 (4.5)

12 Cell counts for the terms in individual years are often too small to
 13 allow public release. However, the totals over the whole 11-year period are
 14 releasable. To understand our methods, equation 4.7 shows the actual numbers
 15 for Medi-cal and welfare respectively, summing over all 11 years (rounded to
 16 hundreds of thousands).

$$\begin{aligned}
 \alpha &= \frac{Y_M - TP_S - FN_S - Y_A(1 - \rho_{FP}^i)}{N_A} \\
 &= \frac{10.4 - 1.2 - 1.2 - 1.0}{2.1} = 3.3 \approx 2.960
 \end{aligned}$$

17 (4.6)

¹⁷ We note that this is the analysis considering the concepts (Medi-Cal, welfare, Medi-Cal Only) separately. It would also be of interest to impute jointly welfare and Medi-Cal. Table 3.3 and the probit regressions reported in Table 3.8 provide the inputs for such an analysis.

We do not perform the full imputation here. The actual imputation would be more complicated than the single imputation attempted here. The single imputation considered here is for a 2x2 table, with two error rates. Fixing one of the error rates is enough to allow computation of the other one from the data.

In contrast, the joint response problem is a 3x3 table, with six distinct error rates. We need to fix four of them to be able to compute adjustment factors for the last two. By analogy, with the approach in the body of the paper, it would be natural to assume that the three upcoding error rates are common. However, that is not sufficient. We still need to fix either the P[W|N] or P[W|MO]. We have seen that both of these errors are common and changing over time, so it is not clear how to proceed.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \alpha &= \frac{Y_M - TP_S - FN_S - Y_A(1 - \rho_{FP}^i)}{N_A} \\
 (4.7) \quad &= \frac{13.9 - 3.6 - 4.4 - 1.5}{3.1} = 1.4 \approx 1.415
 \end{aligned}$$

2 Thus, over the full 11 years, the MEDS has 10.4 million adults on Medi-
 3 Cal. The matched CPS data have 1.2 million true positives and 1.2 million
 4 false negatives. Using the imputational false positive rates and false
 5 negative rates, we would estimate 1.0 million false positives and 2.1 million
 6 false negatives in the unmatched sample. To align the CPS totals with the
 7 MEDS totals, we need to increase the false negative count by a factor of
 8 3.3/2.960 (i.e., from 2.1 to 6.9/7.0 million, where the first figure is
 9 implied by the rounded data and the second figure is implied by the unrounded
 10 data).

11 For welfare, the MEDS has 13.9 million adults on welfare. The matched
 12 CPS data have 3.6 million true positives and 4.4 million false negatives.
 13 Using the imputational false positive rates and false negative rates, we would
 14 estimate 1.5 million false positives and 3.1 million false negatives in the
 15 unmatched sample. To align the CPS totals with the MEDS totals, we need to
 16 increase the false negative count by a factor of 1.4 (i.e., from 3.1 million
 17 to 4.3 million; to the hundreds of thousands, the rounded and unrounded
 18 answers are identical, so we only need to report one figure).

19 **STRATIFYING**

20 The above analysis is applicable when the population is homogeneous. In
 21 reality, the population is heterogeneous. We are able to address this to some
 22 extent. We have a small number of variables—calendar year (in principle, also
 23 gender and age)—that are measured (nearly) consistently in the MEDS and the
 24 CPS. For these variables, we can totally stratify (i.e., we will compute a
 25 different value of α for every strata).

26 In addition to the small number of variables that are common to both data
 27 sets, we have many other covariates in the CPS. This allows us to estimate
 28 the false negative and false positive rates in the matched sample, not only in
 29 terms of the small set of common variables, but also in terms of the larger
 30 number of variables in the CPS alone. These are exactly the imputational
 31 regressions discussed in Chapter 3.

1 Using these multivariate models seems particularly important for two
 2 reasons. First, many of these variables are likely to be strongly related to
 3 Medi-Cal/welfare eligibility and therefore to true Medi-Cal/welfare coverage,
 4 e.g., marital status, presence of children in the household, and household
 5 earnings. Second, dual coverage (Medicaid and also other, usually private,
 6 health insurance) is an issue of substantive interest. As much as possible,
 7 we want to correctly impute in the sub-samples with and without private health
 8 insurance.

9 Suppose that within the strata, s , we can assign each individual his/her
 10 own ρ , then we can write our equation for α as:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Y_{M,s} &= TP_{S,s} + FN_{S,s} + \sum_{j \in Y_A} w_j (1 - \rho_{FP}^i[j]) + \alpha_s \sum_{k \in N_A} w_k \rho_{FN}^i[k] \\
 \alpha_s &= \frac{Y_{M,s} - TP_{S,s} - FN_{S,s} - \sum_{j \in Y_A} w_j (1 - \rho_{FP}^i[j])}{\sum_{k \in N_A} w_k \rho_{FN}^i[k]}
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{4.8}$$

12 In practice, we use the predictions of the imputational probit regression
 13 models from the previous chapter to estimate the ρ s.¹⁸

14 For this project, we have the matched data. However, given the
 15 imputational probit model, this approach can also be applied to the CPS public
 16 use data by those who do not have the matched data. To see this write

$$\begin{aligned}
 Y_{M,s} &= \sum_{j \in Y_S \cup Y_A} w_j (1 - \rho_{FP}^i[j]) + \gamma_s \sum_{k \in N_S \cup N_A} w_k \rho_{FN}^i[k] \\
 \gamma_s &= \frac{Y_{M,s} - \sum_{j \in Y_S \cup Y_A} w_j (1 - \rho_{FP}^i[j])}{\sum_{k \in N_S \cup N_A} w_k \rho_{FN}^i[k]}
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{4.9}$$

18 Below, we compute α and γ for each strata. Thus, an analyst without access to
 19 the matched data could also create an imputed data set.

20 In what follows, we apply this approach directly to our CPS data. We
 21 stratify by year. In practice, the estimates within demographic sub-groups
 22 are too small to yield reliable estimates. Table 4.1 presents the resulting
 23 estimates for α . For adults, the adjustment factors are quite large in the
 24 early years. For Medi-Cal, we need to triple or even quadruple the false

¹⁸ The form of the equation in the text is computationally straight-forward. One could argue that it would be more consistent with the probit modeling strategy to include α inside the probit index. Doing so would require a non-linear optimization to compute α .

1 negative rates in the early years, suggesting that the unmatched sample is
 2 very different from the matched sample. For welfare, despite the fact that
 3 the under-reporting is absolutely more severe, the unmatched sample is closer
 4 to the matched sample. The highest adjustment factors are only slightly
 5 greater than two. The Medi-Cal Only adjustment factors are even larger than
 6 those for Medi-Cal.

7 **Table 4.1**
 8 **Adjustment Factors α**

Year	Adults			Children		
	M	W	MO	M	W	MO
1990	3.0	1.8	3.3	5.6	5.8	2.9
1991	4.2	2.0	4.8	8.1	7.9	3.8
1992	3.7	2.2	4.1	7.0	6.9	3.5
1993	3.2	1.8	3.8	7.3	8.5	3.7
1994	3.6	1.3	4.7	5.0	5.7	2.2
1995	2.9	1.6	3.3	5.3	5.4	2.4
1996	2.1	1.2	2.5	5.5	5.0	2.5
1997	2.9	1.5	3.2	5.4	5.9	2.4
1998	2.1	1.3	2.9	5.2	5.5	2.7
1999	1.4	1.2	1.4	4.6	3.9	2.5
2000	1.4	0.7	1.8	7.2	6.8	3.4
Average	2.5	1.4	2.9	6.2	6.4	3.0

9
 10 Over the 11 years covered by our analysis, the adjustment factors shrink.
 11 By 2000, the adjustment factor for Medi-Cal is under 1.5; for welfare, under
 12 1; and for Medi-Cal Only, under 2. It is not clear whether these changes over
 13 time result from changes in the CPS instrument or from changes in who is
 14 receiving welfare. The large drop in 1995 is consistent with the desired
 15 effects of the change in the CPS instrument in that year. The drop in 2000
 16 would also be consistent with the changes in the CPS instrument in that year.
 17 Unfortunately, the drop seems to date back to 1999, one year too early. The
 18 preceding discussion applies to adults, for whom we potentially have a SSN.
 19 We do not have SSNs for any children. Following Census practice, we impute
 20 from parents to children.¹⁹ For Medi-Cal this is consistent with Census's

¹⁹ See for example the March CPS documentation for 1990 (p. 9-8; <http://www.census.gov/aprd/techdoc/cps/cpsmar00.pdf>): "After data collection and creation of an initial microdata file, further refinements were made to assign Medicaid coverage to children. In this procedure all children under 21 years old in families were assumed to be covered by Medicaid if either the householder or spouse reported being covered by Medicaid (this procedure was required mainly because the Medicaid coverage question was asked only for persons 15 old and over). All adult AFDC recipients and their children, and

1 logical imputations. If parents have Medicaid, then children are imputed to
2 have Medicaid. For welfare, this is definitional. Children are never asked
3 about welfare in the CPS. Instead, we impute welfare to both adults and
4 children based on the receipt of public assistance from a welfare program. We
5 then follow the equivalent approach; in other words, we adjust the false
6 negative rate until it aligns the imputed data with the MEDS totals.

7 We note that the adjustment factors for children are much higher.
8 Furthermore, unlike the adjustment factors for adults, the adjustment factors
9 for children do not fall through time. These adjustment factors are large
10 enough to cast some doubt on the quality of the imputations for children. The
11 adjustments will align the total number of children with the control counts.
12 Our methods impute to children in proportion to the false negative rates.
13 This continues to be a reasonable approach. However, the adjustment factors
14 are so large as to suggest that there is some factor beyond false negatives
15 explaining the under-reporting for children. Whatever it is, the matched data
16 do not identify it.

17 Given the adjustment factors shown in Table 4.1, we create a multiply-
18 imputed data set. For the matched data, we overwrite the CPS data with the
19 MEDS data. For the unmatched "Yes" responses, we multiply impute based on the
20 false positive rates implied by the probit regression coefficients from the
21 matched sample. For the unmatched "No" responses, we multiply impute based on
22 the product of the false negative rates implied by the probit coefficients
23 from the matched sample and the adjustment factor, α , for this survey year.

24 In practice, we create two data sets, one for the analysis of Medi-Cal
25 (and health insurance) and a second for the analysis of welfare. We do not
26 attempt the full joint imputation of Welfare and Medi-Cal Only. In the
27 subsequent chapters we use the multiply-imputed data sets to obtain a better
28 understanding of how the mis-reporting in the CPS can affect different types
29 of analyses. Specifically, in Chapter 5, we examine how mis-reporting of
30 Medi-Cal receipt affects estimates of the number of uninsured in California
31 and in Chapter 6 we look at how mis-reporting of Medi-Cal and welfare
32 participation affect estimates of program take-up.

SSI recipients living in States which legally require Medicaid coverage of all
SSI recipients, were also assigned coverage."

1

5. NEW ESTIMATES OF THE UNINSURED

2 Having characterized the under-reporting problem and described our
3 approach to estimating true rates from the matched data, in this chapter we
4 present the first substantive results of this paper—adjusted health insurance
5 rates, overall and by subgroups.

6 DUAL REPORTING

7 To provide improved estimates of the number of people who are uninsured,
8 the crucial issue concerns dual coverage. We know the number of people with
9 Medi-Cal exactly from the MEDS administrative data. However, our matched data
10 provides no new information on who has private health insurance coverage. If
11 no one had both Medi-Cal and private health insurance, we could compute the
12 number of uninsured as the total population less the MEDS estimate of those on
13 welfare and the CPS estimate of those with private health insurance.

14 However, dual coverage is possible and not uncommon. First, it is
15 possible that a person has both Medi-Cal and other health insurance in a given
16 month. Second, over the course of a year, some months of Medi-Cal and some
17 months of other insurance are even more likely. In the matched sample, about
18 23.9 percent of adults who report to the CPS that they have Medi-Cal also
19 report private coverage. (See Table 5.1.) Over the entire sample, the figure
20 for children is also 23.9 percent. For survey year 2000 (the last year for
21 which we have matched data; note that this refers to calendar year 1999),
22 slightly more adults are dually covered (27.6 percent) and slightly fewer
23 children (20.3 percent).

24 These are the dual-coverage rates for everyone in the matched sample who
25 reports having Medi-Cal. Figure 5.1 demonstrates that they are not the
26 relevant population for the computation of the increase in health insurance
27 when we correct for under-reporting. On net, our imputation moves people from
28 the first row (does not have Medi-Cal) to the second row (has Medi-Cal). For
29 people with other health insurance (OHI; the left column of Table 5.1), there
30 is no net increase in health insurance/decrease in uninsurance. For people
31 without other health insurance (the right column of Table 5.1), there is a net
32 increase in health insurance/decrease in uninsurance.

1 The previous tabulations implicitly assume that those to whom we impute
 2 Medi-Cal are like those with Medi-Cal. However, this seems unlikely. We have
 3 already seen that reporting no Medi-Cal in the CPS when one actually had Medi-
 4 Cal varies with the intensity of Medi-Cal in the previous year. As the number
 5 of months of Medi-Cal enrollment drops, the probability of a false negative
 6 increases; and false negatives are the population to whom we are trying to
 7 impute Medi-Cal.

8 **Figure 5.1**
 9 **Dual Coverage Rates and Adjusting Total Health Insurance Coverage**
 10 **(OHI: Other-non-Medi-Cal-Health Insurance)**

		CPS Reports of OHI	
		No	Yes
Medi-Cal	No	A: Uncovered	B: OHI Only
Enrollment	Yes	C: Medi-Cal Only	D: Dual Coverage

11 Furthermore, it seems plausible that such people are more likely to have OHI.
 12 One reason to drop Medi-Cal is gaining private insurance. In the matched
 13 sample, we can identify such false negatives. Indeed, they have higher rates
 14 of OHI (see Table 5.1) and the difference is non-trivial. For example, for
 15 adults over the entire period, 23.9 percent of those with Medi-Cal also have
 16 OHI; for the false negatives, the figure is a quarter higher at 32.4 percent.

17 These tabulations are informative for three imputation methods possible
 18 with only the public-use file and aggregate tabulations from the
 19 administrative data. To understand the argument, we introduce some new
 20 notation:

21 (5.1)
$$U = T - OHI - MC + DC$$

22 The number of uninsured individuals (U) can be computed as the total
 23 population (T) less the count of those with other (non-Medi-Cal) health
 24 insurance (OHI), less the count of those with Medicaid insurance (MC), and
 25 adding back in those with dual coverage—other health insurance and Medicaid
 26 (DC). The results of the previous chapter imply that the CPS estimate of MC
 27 is much too small.

28 Given this formulation, the three imputation methods are:

29 Method 1: Raw CPS Data $U = T - OHI_{CPS} - MC_{CPS} + DC_{CPS}$: Since

30 Medicaid/Medi-Cal is seriously under-reported, simply using
 31 the raw data will yield an estimate of the number of
 32 uninsured that is too high.

1 Method 2: *Simple Administrative Data Adjustment*

2 $U = T - OHI_{CPS} - MC_{CPS} + DC_{CPS} - (MC_{Admin} - MC_{CPS})$: Since there is
 3 significant dual coverage, estimating the number of uninsured
 4 as the total population less the CPS estimate of OHI and the
 5 administrative data estimate of Medicaid/Medi-Cal will yield
 6 an estimate of the number of uninsured that is too low.

7 Method 3: *Public-Use File Adjustment for Dual Coverage*

8 $U = T - OHI_{CPS} - MC_{CPS} + DC_{CPS} + (1 - \delta_{CPS})(MC_{Admin} - MC_{CPS})$: The
 9 simple administrative data adjustment implicitly assumes no
 10 dual coverage. However, we can generate a rough estimate of
 11 dual coverage from the Public Use File, δ_{CPS} , as the fraction
 12 of those reporting Medicaid in the CPS who also report OHI.
 13

14 This third Method will be appropriate if the dual-coverage rates among
 15 those reporting Medi-Cal (i.e., the union of the true positives and the false
 16 positives) equaled the dual-coverage rates among the false negatives.
 17 However, it seems plausible that it is exactly people who had private health
 18 insurance (perhaps at the end of the year) who would not report the Medi-Cal
 19 they had (perhaps at the beginning of the year). Tabulations from the matched
 20 sample are consistent with this hypothesis. (See Table 5.2). This suggests
 21 using the dual-coverage rates from the false negatives in the matched sample
 22 in the adjustment above and that doing so will yield a larger estimate of the
 23 number of uninsured.

24 This analysis is only an approximation. The full analysis has 16 cells:
 25 (matched/unmatched) x (private health insurance yes/no) x (TP, FN, FP, TN) and
 26 the total number of uninsured is:

$$27 \quad U = TN[S, N] + FP[S, N] + TN[A, N] + FP[A, N]$$

28 where the function arguments are S/A for SSN present/SSN absent and Y/N for
 29 private health insurance/no private health insurance. Then, in both the
 30 matched and unmatched samples, there are two ways to be uninsured: (1) true
 31 negative for Medicaid and no private health insurance; or (2) false positive
 32 for Medi-Cal and no private health insurance.

33 Given the assumption that the MEDS data is truth for Medi-Cal and the CPS
 34 data is truth for private health insurance (we can do no better), we know the
 35 first two terms exactly and the rates from the matched sample are plausibly

1 informative about the last two terms (i.e., rates in the unmatched sample).

2 This analysis suggests two more estimators of the number of uninsured:

3

4 Method 4: *FN Adjustment for Dual Coverage*

5
$$U = T - OHI_{CPS} - MC_{CPS} - DC_{CPS} + (1 - \delta_{FN})(MC_{Admin} - MC_{CPS})$$
: Since
 6 the major concern is dual coverage among the false negatives,
 7 it seems preferable to use the rate from the matched sample's
 8 FNs, δ_{FN} . Of course, this is only possible with the matched
 9 data.

10 Method 5: *Full Imputation Model*: The imputation models we estimated in
 11 the previous chapter include (control for) private health
 12 insurance coverage. They thus control for dual coverage in
 13 all four cells (TP, FN, FP, TN).

14 OUR APPROACH AND OUR RESULTS

15 Table 5.2 reports the results of these five adjustments for adults and
 16 children, pooled over the entire file and for the last year (the 2000 survey
 17 year, corresponding to calendar year 1999). Consider first adults over the
 18 entire panel. For this group, under-reporting is about 4.1 percent of the
 19 total. The raw CPS estimate of uninsurance is 23.4 percent. Simply adding
 20 back in the under-reporting cuts the estimated fraction of uninsured to 19.3
 21 percent.

22 **Table 5.1**
 23 **Estimates of Dual Coverage and Uninsurance**

	Pooled				2000/1999			
	Adults		Children		Adults		Children	
	DC	UI	DC	UI	DC	UI	DC	UI
Under-reported		4.1%		12.7%		4.1%		11.8%
Method 1		23.4%		23.2%		23.2%		21.9%
Method 2	0.0%	19.3%	0.0%	10.6%	0.0%	19.1%	0.0%	10.1%
Method 3	23.9%	20.3%	17.0%	13.6%	27.6%	20.2%	20.3%	12.5%
Method 4	32.4%	20.6%	32.4%	14.7%	31.2%	20.4%	40.2%	14.9%
Method 5	32.1%	20.6%	37.0%	15.3%	34.4%	20.5%	45.0%	15.4%

24 Note: DC-estimate of dual coverage used to adjust estimates of uninsurance;
 25 UI-fraction of the population uninsured.

26

27 Rows are:

28 Under-reported: Fraction of the population under-reported (MEDS-
 29 CPS/Total Population).

30 Method 1: Raw CPS Data

31 Method 2: Medi-Cal from MEDS, implicitly assuming no double counting

1 Method 3: Medi-Cal from MEDS, using dual coverage rate among those in
2 the matched sample who report Medi-Cal
3 Method 4: Medi-Cal from MEDS, using dual coverage rate among false
4 negatives in the matched sample
5 Method 5: Full multivariate imputation (see below)

6

7 This estimate is clearly too small. It assumes no dual coverage. Using the
8 rate of dual coverage among those reporting Medi-Cal (Method 3) yields a
9 slightly higher estimate of the fraction uninsured, 20.3 percent. Using
10 either the rate of dual coverage among the false negatives (Method 4) or the
11 full imputation model (Method 5) yields estimates of uninsurance of 20.6
12 percent, much lower than the simple CPS estimate (23.4 percent) and slightly
13 higher than simply adding back in the under-reporting (20.3 percent). Thus,
14 for adults, all that matters is that we make some adjustment for under-
15 reporting. Differences between the various adjustments are quite small.

16 For children over the entire period, under-reporting is a much bigger
17 problem, 12.7 percent of all children (versus 4.1 percent of all adults), and
18 the divergence between the estimates of dual coverage is larger. Therefore,
19 the effect of the different correction methodologies varies. The raw CPS
20 estimate of uninsurance is 23.2 percent. Simply subtracting off the under-
21 reporting (Method 2) cuts that estimate to 10.6 percent. The three
22 corrections for dual coverage (Method 3, Method 4, and Method 5) successively
23 raise the uninsurance rates. Our preferred estimate is from Method 5 (the
24 last row). It suggests true uninsurance rates of 15.3 percent. This estimate
25 is considerably lower than the unadjusted estimate of 23.2, but considerably
26 higher than the no dual coverage estimate of 10.6.

27 The right side of the table gives the equivalent figures for the last
28 year of our data, survey year 2000 referring to calendar year 1999. Dual-
29 coverage rates are slightly higher, but the qualitative story and the
30 estimates of uninsurance are similar.

31 **DISCUSSION**

32 This analysis suggests that under-reporting of Medi-Cal seriously
33 inflates our estimates of the size of the uninsured population. In addition,
34 dual coverage is sufficiently common that ignoring it results in a significant
35 underestimate of the size of the uninsured population even after we correct
36 for under-reporting.

1 Thus, some correction for dual coverage is needed. On a priori grounds,
2 this dual-coverage estimate from the false negatives in the matched sample
3 seems to be a preferable estimate of the unmatched false negatives than the
4 simple CPS public-use file estimate. Evidence from the matched sample
5 suggests that dual coverage is slightly more common among false negatives and
6 also more common than the simple CPS public-use file estimate. Using this
7 plausibly better estimate yields a slightly higher estimate of the uninsured.
8 Using the full imputation model yields an estimate that is slightly higher.
9 The size of the corrections will vary with the magnitude of the under-
10 reporting and the amount of dual coverage.

11 Our best estimates of dual coverage suggest that the raw CPS figures
12 over-estimate uninsurance by about three percentage points for adults and
13 eight percentage points for children. These are sizable over-estimates. They
14 imply that the problems of lack of health insurance are non-trivial, but that
15 they are considerably smaller than what would be implied by the simple CPS
16 tabulations.

17

18

1

6. NEW ESTIMATES OF MEDI-CAL AND WELFARE TAKE-UP RATES

2 If the only question of interest was: "How many people are enrolled in
3 welfare/Medicaid?", we could answer that question directly from the
4 administrative data. However, both researchers' and policy makers' interest
5 typically goes well beyond the number of people enrolled to concerns about
6 take-up rates. The question of interest is what share of the target
7 population is actually enrolled in the program of interest. This is a rate
8 that cannot be measured with administrative data. While the numerator (i.e.,
9 the number of people enrolled) is available in the administrative data, the
10 denominator (i.e., the number of people in the target population) is not,
11 because the administrative data only includes information on those actually
12 enrolled in the program.

13 Therefore, to estimate take-up rates, analysts generally turn to survey
14 data for both pieces of information (i.e., the number of people in the target
15 population and the number of people enrolled). Unfortunately, we have seen
16 that actual enrollment is seriously under-reported in survey data, so take-up
17 rates based on these data will also be under-reported. Furthermore, we have
18 seen that under-reporting is not random. Non-reporting is more common among
19 those who are covered for less of the year and closer to the border of
20 eligibility.

21 In this chapter, we use the adjusted California CPS data based on the
22 analyses and methods described in the previous chapters to generate new
23 estimates of take-up rates. We note that the estimates here are not pure
24 take-up rates. Pure take-up rate estimates would attempt to impute
25 eligibility for Medi-Cal based on all of the survey information and Medi-Cal
26 program rules. Here, we perform only rudimentary take-up computations (i.e.,
27 the fraction of a demographic sub-group enrolled) without attempting a full
28 eligibility simulation.

29 POOLED RESULTS

30 We begin by pooling across all of the years in our analysis, 1990-2000.
31 Table 6.1 presents our basic results for Medi-Cal, in the format used for all
32 the tables that follow. The left panel refers to adults (15-65); the right
33 panel refers to children (0-14). The rows consider subgroups related to Medi-

1 Cal and welfare eligibility: everyone, males, females, single women with
 2 children—overall and by poverty status. For each group, we report the
 3 unadjusted CPS take-up rate (the ratio of enrollees to the population), the
 4 adjusted rate (after our imputations from the matched data), and the “Delta”—
 5 the increase with imputation (the ratio of the adjusted to the unadjusted
 6 take-up rates minus one; note that the ratio is computed from the underlying
 7 figures with more significant digits; it thus will differ from what would be
 8 computed using the “Raw” and “Imputed” columns).

9 **Table 6.1**
 10 **Take-Up Rates: Unadjusted, Adjusted, Discrepancy**
 11 **Medi-Cal, Pooled Years**

	Adults			Children		
	Raw	Imputed	Delta	Raw	Imputed	Delta
All	10%	14%	44%	24%	36%	54%
Male	7%	10%	39%	23%	36%	52%
Female	12%	18%	46%	24%	37%	55%
SW w/kids	28%	39%	41%	24%	37%	55%
SW w/kids <50% FPL	48%	65%	36%	45%	70%	54%
SW w/kids 50%-100% FP	60%	74%	23%	53%	71%	34%
SW w/kids 100%-150% FP	40%	55%	39%	34%	52%	52%
SW w/kids 150%-200% FP	21%	41%	91%	17%	44%	154%
SW w/kids >200% FPL	8%	14%	79%	6%	10%	70%

12 Note: “Raw” is the unadjusted CPS estimate; “Imputed” is the
 13 adjusted CPS estimate, based on the multiply-imputed data set; and
 14 “Delta” is the percentage (not percentage point) increase in estimated
 15 take-up with imputation.
 16

17 Overall Medi-Cal take-up increases by about half when we adjust for
 18 under-reporting using our imputation model. The increases are slightly
 19 smaller for adults (44 percent) and slightly larger for children (54 percent).
 20 Consistent with an explanation of under-reporting in terms of stigma, the
 21 increases are smallest for those in poverty, largest for those between one and
 22 two times poverty, and large for those at more than twice poverty.

23 We note the anomalous result that, even after adjustment, adults at less
 24 than half the poverty line have lower take-up rates than those between half
 25 the poverty line and the poverty line. Welfare is considered income in the
 26 computation of the poverty line. In California, welfare will take a family to
 27 more than half the poverty line. Therefore, the families at less than half
 28 the poverty line are unlikely to have contact with the welfare system.

29 Table 6.2 presents comparable estimates for welfare. Consistent with
 30 earlier results, compared to Medi-Cal, the levels of take-up are lower and the

1 adjustments have a larger effect. The average adjustment more than doubles
 2 take-up rates. Again, the adjustments are larger for children, smaller for
 3 those in poverty, and larger for those out of poverty.

4 **Table 6.2**
 5 **Take-Up Rates: Unadjusted, Adjusted, Discrepancy**
 6 **Welfare, Pooled Years**

	Adults			Children		
	Raw	Imputed	Delta	Raw	Imputed	Delta
All	3%	6%	109%	11%	25%	132%
Male	1%	4%	355%	10%	24%	136%
Female	5%	9%	70%	11%	25%	129%
SW w/kids	15%	24%	58%	11%	25%	129%
SW w/kids <50% FPL	25%	43%	67%	22%	57%	159%
SW w/kids 50%-100% FP	41%	55%	34%	32%	60%	87%
SW w/kids 100%-150% FP	20%	33%	60%	14%	32%	128%
SW w/kids 150%-200% FP	9%	19%	119%	5%	21%	288%
SW w/kids >200% FPL	3%	6%	134%	1%	4%	287%

7
 8 Table 6.3 presents comparable estimates for Medi-Cal only. Our earlier
 9 analysis suggested little net under-count of Medi-Cal Only, apparently because
 10 many people with welfare, report Medi-Cal Only. Consistent with that earlier
 11 analysis, the adjustment deltas are smaller than for either welfare or Medi-
 12 Cal, on average 15 percent for adults and negative 6 percent for children.
 13 Consistent with the mis-reporting of welfare explanation, the corrections are
 14 small for the poor in single female families, the population likely to be
 15 eligible for welfare. For better-off families, the corrections are larger,
 16 consistent with true under-reporting of Medi-Cal only in the population that
 17 is usually ineligible for welfare.

18 **Table 6.3**
 19 **Take-Up Rates: Unadjusted, Adjusted, Discrepancy**
 20 **Medi-Cal Only, Pooled Years**

	Adults			Children		
	Raw	Imputed	Delta	Raw	Imputed	Delta
All	7%	8%	15%	15%	14%	-6%
Male	6%	6%	1%	15%	14%	-7%
Female	7%	9%	27%	15%	14%	-6%
SW w/kids	13%	14%	15%	15%	14%	-6%
SW w/kids <50% FPL	23%	22%	-4%	32%	29%	-7%
SW w/kids 50%-100% FP	19%	20%	5%	28%	25%	-10%
SW w/kids 100%-150% FP	19%	23%	18%	24%	22%	-6%
SW w/kids 150%-200% FP	13%	20%	60%	15%	20%	33%
SW w/kids >200% FPL	5%	6%	22%	5%	4%	-20%

1 Table 6.4, Table 6.5, and Table 6.6 present the equivalent results for
2 the last year of our data, the 2000 survey referring to the 1999 calendar
3 year. Consistent with our basic analysis of under-reporting in Chapter 2, the
4 results are similar for Medi-Cal and Medi-Cal Only. However, for welfare,
5 there has been a sharp increase in non-reporting. Correspondingly, the deltas
6 are much higher in 2000 than in the pooled sample, both overall for adults
7 (169 percent versus 109 percent) and for children (263 percent versus 132
8 percent).

1
2
3

Table 6.4
Take-Up Rates: Unadjusted, Adjusted, Discrepancy
Medi-Cal, 2000 Survey/1999 Calendar Year

	Adults			Children		
	Raw	Imputed	Delta	Raw	Imputed	Delta
All	9%	13%	42%	24%	35%	50%
Male	7%	9%	37%	24%	35%	49%
Female	11%	17%	45%	23%	35%	51%
SW w/kids	25%	36%	46%	23%	35%	51%
SW w/kids <50% FPL	49%	59%	21%	47%	65%	38%
SW w/kids 50%-100% FP	48%	63%	31%	52%	67%	30%
SW w/kids 100%-150% FP	41%	55%	34%	37%	51%	38%
SW w/kids 150%-200% FP	24%	45%	84%	22%	54%	139%
SW w/kids >200% FPL	8%	16%	104%	7%	13%	72%

4
5
6

Table 6.5
Take-Up Rates: Unadjusted, Adjusted, Discrepancy
Welfare, 2000 Survey/1999 Calendar Year

	Adults			Children		
	Raw	Imputed	Delta	Raw	Imputed	Delta
All	2%	4%	169%	5%	19%	263%
Male	0%	3%	523%	6%	19%	228%
Female	3%	6%	117%	5%	20%	304%
SW w/kids	8%	18%	123%	5%	20%	304%
SW w/kids <50% FPL	19%	35%	82%	14%	54%	286%
SW w/kids 50%-100% FP	17%	37%	114%	10%	45%	339%
SW w/kids 100%-150% FP	17%	31%	82%	10%	30%	190%
SW w/kids 150%-200% FP	5%	16%	193%	6%	22%	246%
SW w/kids >200% FPL	1%	6%	482%	0%	3%	3967%[?]

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Table 6.6
Take-Up Rates: Unadjusted, Adjusted, Discrepancy
Medi-Cal Only, 2000 Survey/1999 Calendar Year

	Adults			Children		
	Raw	Imputed	Delta	Raw	Imputed	Delta
All	8%	9%	14%	20%	18%	-9%
Male	6%	7%	7%	20%	18%	-6%
Female	9%	10%	20%	20%	17%	-11%
SW w/kids	17%	17%	2%	20%	17%	-11%
SW w/kids <50% FPL	29%	24%	-20%	40%	29%	-28%
SW w/kids 50%-100% FP	31%	27%	-13%	46%	38%	-17%
SW w/kids 100%-150% FP	24%	23%	-6%	29%	25%	-16%
SW w/kids 150%-200% FP	19%	27%	44%	19%	28%	46%
SW w/kids >200% FPL	7%	8%	25%	7%	7%	-10%

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1 **DISCUSSION**

2 This chapter has considered the effect of correcting for under-reporting
3 of program enrollment in sub-populations using our imputation model for
4 program take-up rates. Our earlier chapters found substantial under-
5 reporting. That under-reporting yields large under-estimates of take-up
6 rates. Furthermore, the variation in take-up rates is not simple. Overall,
7 the corrections appear to be smallest for those in deepest poverty and larger
8 for those with only borderline eligibility. This pattern is consistent with
9 greater stigma for the borderline eligible. It is also consistent with the
10 borderline-eligible only being enrolled for part of the year; we have seen
11 that those enrolled for part of the year are less likely to report enrollment
12 in the CPS.

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7. CONCLUSION

2 This report describes analyses of matched CPS-MEDS data. The CPS data
3 are known to have substantial under-reporting of Medi-Cal enrollment and even
4 larger under-reporting of welfare enrollment. The matched data—along with
5 some auxiliary assumptions—generate adjusted and improved estimates of who is
6 covered by Medi-Cal in the CPS and of true health insurance coverage rates.
7 In brief, we find that adjusting substantially cuts the estimates of the
8 uninsured population and substantially increases estimates of take-up rates.

9 Given that these results confirm that the CPS data significantly
10 undercounts enrollment, do these results suggest any solution? Happily the
11 answer appears to be “yes.” Non-reporting is differential, but the
12 differentials are second-order compared to the non-reporting itself. Simple
13 ratio adjustments with a simple correction for dual coverage (e.g., from those
14 in the CPS who report Medi-Cal coverage) are likely to eliminate most of the
15 bias.

16 Such simple ratio adjustments can be computed from unmatched tabulations
17 from the CPS and the MEDS. These under-count rates do vary over time. Thus,
18 current official tabulations are needed. CDHS and CMS already publish some
19 such tabulations. To correct the CPS, ideally one would use tabulations
20 slightly different from those currently published. The necessary tabulations
21 would consider any receipt in the past year, with consistent breaks by program
22 and age. CDHS could easily generate the requisite tabulations.

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1 **APPENDIX A. DETAILED NOTES ON FILE CONSTRUCTION AND MATCHING**

2 This appendix describes in detail the procedures we used to create our
3 analysis files. We begin by describing the raw data files we received, how we
4 merged them together, and the results of our efforts to eliminate false
5 matches. This appendix concludes with a discussion of the congruence of
6 race/ethnicity coding across the two data sources.

7 **A.1. THE RAW DATA**

8 This project's analyses are made possible by the availability of
9 scrambled SSNs (referred to by Census as PIKs) on both the CPS data and on the
10 MEDS data. Specifically, we received three files:

- 11 • *MEDS File*: We received an extract from the Medi-Cal Eligibility
12 Data System (MEDS). The MEDS is the official roster of those on
13 Medi-Cal in California. Conceptually the file contained one record
14 for each person who appeared in the MEDS data in any month between
15 January 1987 and December 2002.²⁰ Given its purpose, anyone who
16 was covered by Medi-Cal during this period (including
17 welfare/AFDC/TANF/CalWORKs) should have a record in the file. The
18 record contains basic demographics (gender, date of birth,
19 race/ethnicity, language) and for each month January 1989 to
20 December 2000²¹ the aid code (i.e., type of Medi-Cal coverage),
21 eligibility status, case id, county-of-residence, and zip code.

²⁰ In fact, to minimize file size, the MEDS data arrived in three files. To understand the three files it is useful to note that the underlying MEDS file was created from archived version of the MEDS created every six months (the "December cut" and the "June cut"), each with 15 months of history. The first file had the time invariant data (gender, date of birth, race/ethnicity, language), taken from the most recent file. The second file had the invariant information from an underlying MEDS "cut file" (county-of-residence, case id, zip code), one record for each person, for each "cut file." The third file had the information that varied every month. The MEDS "cut files" are overlapping. We used the information from the most recent file.

²¹ Note that we have monthly data for a narrower window (January 1999 to December 2000) than the period over which one would have needed to have been covered by Medi-Cal to be in the file at all (January 1997 to December 2002). The net result is that people who were covered by Medi-Cal in the broader window, but not in the narrower window, will have MEDS records that never show Medi-Cal coverage (all "zeros"). See the next section for a discussion of the implications of this distinction.

- 1 Finally, the file contained a Census generated PIK (Protected
2 Identification Key). This file contained 22,848,715 persons.
- 3 • *CPS File*: We created the CPS file directly from the March Public
4 Use Files. This file contained 1,588,115 observations from 1990 to
5 2000. The CPS rotation group structure implies that most people
6 will appear in two successive CPS files. This observation count
7 thus counts such people twice. We have made no correction for that
8 correlation.
 - 9 • *Cross-walk File*: For every person in the March CPS for interview
10 years 1990 to 2000, the cross-walk file contained the PIK
11 (Protected Identification Key), the CPS Household Number, the CPS
12 Person Number. The file contained 1,347,282 observations
13 (including interviews inside and outside of California).

14 Unfortunately, the Cross-walk Files we received were not consistent
15 across years. For every individual 15 and older, the CPS interviewer requests
16 a Social Security Number (SSN). In practice, not everyone supplies a SSN; and
17 not all of those SSNs that are reported are correct (some due to simple errors
18 of memory or transcription; some due to deliberate obfuscation). As far as we
19 have been able to ascertain, over the CPS years we are analyzing (1990-2000),
20 there have been no significant changes in the procedures for the collection of
21 SSNs, nor for the verification of SSNs.

22 We note that the CPS files we use are of two types. Some of the files
23 are "unvalidated." This apparently means that the SSNs from which the PIKs
24 were constructed are as recorded by the Census interviewer.

25 This is in contrast to "validated" files. "Validated" files differ in
26 two ways. First, those SSNs that were provided were checked against Social
27 Security Administration SSN records (apparently checking for a match on name,
28 gender, and birth date). When the CPS provided information that did not match
29 the information in the SSA records for that SSN, the SSN was dropped (even
30 though a SSN had been provided).

31 Second, those individuals who did not or could not provide a SSN were
32 asked for permission to use SSA files to impute a SSN. When permission was
33 granted, the name, gender, and birth date provided were matched against SSA
34 records. When a match was found, that SSN was appended to the record (even
35 though no SSN had been provided at the interview).

1 As we note in the body of the report. In validated files, a higher
2 percentage of records have SSNs and a lower fraction of the matches are "bad."

3 We also note that our analysis would be easier and of higher quality if
4 we had a consistent time series (ideally, all validated; but alternatively all
5 unvalidated). Presumably, unvalidated versions of the files for each year
6 once existed. We were, however, informed that unvalidated versions of the
7 validated files were not available; and that, Census could not provide
8 validated versions of the currently unvalidated data within the time frame of
9 the project (i.e., in six to nine months).

10 **A.2. MATCHING THE CPS AND THE MEDS**

11 In principle, the cross-walk file should allow us to link MEDS records to
12 CPS individuals. The link, however, will never be complete.

13 For example, in order to complete the link, we must have a SSN for each
14 CPS individual. However, as noted above, not everyone has a SSN in the files
15 we received. Individuals under 15 years of age were not asked to provide
16 SSNs.²² Many of those asked to provide SSNs were unable to do so or refused.
17 Only some of those asked gave permission for SSA to impute a SSN, and only for
18 some of those people who gave permission, did SSA actually provide a SSN.

19 **A.3. VERIFYING MATCHES**

20 The previous discussion concerns mechanical matches of records in the two
21 files. As we discuss below in detail, there must be false non-matches in the
22 matching process: People who were actually enrolled in Medi-Cal, but for whom
23 we cannot match MEDS and CPS records. Given the non-trivial rates of not
24 providing a SSN, it seems likely that most of these false non-matches are
25 people who refused to provide a SSN. In addition, some people are likely to
26 have provided an incorrect SSN that did not match to any MEDS record (and
27 which was not caught by the SSA validation process, perhaps because this was a
28 year in which no validation was done). There does not appear to be anything
29 that we can do directly about this. However, we discuss below our indirect
30 adjustments for this issue.

²² Given the CPS rolling panel structure, it might be possible to recover SSNs for half of the 14 year olds, by using conventional CPS matching methods (to match the SSN provided at their second March interview (when they were 15) to their first March interview (when they were 14)). We have not done so.

1 There is also the possibility of false matches: People who provided a SSN
2 that matched to the MEDS, but for whom the two records do not represent the
3 same person. In unvalidated years, this might represent people who gave the
4 wrong SSN (a memory error, a transcription error, or deliberate obfuscation).
5 In validated years, such errors should almost always have been caught by
6 comparisons of name, gender, and age between the CPS responses and the SSA
7 files.

8 To assure that both the CPS and MEDS records with the same SSN truly
9 referred to the same individual, we verified the correspondence of gender and
10 age between the MEDS data and the CPS data (where we use the term "verified"
11 to refer to our cross-check and the term "validated" to refer to SSA's cross-
12 check). We considered matches to be verified if gender matched and age
13 differed by no more than one year (i.e., we did not require an *exact* match on
14 age). Matches not meeting both of these criteria were deemed false or bad
15 matches and dropped at this verification stage.

16 In such cases where the SSNs match, some (perhaps most) of the failure to
17 "verify" is probably caused by incorrect recording of SSN, gender, or age in
18 the MEDS or in the CPS. Note that in validated years, the validation process
19 should have caused the SSN to be dropped from CPS records for which the SSN,
20 gender, and age information did not match the SSA administrative data. The
21 net result should have been higher quality SSN, gender, and age information in
22 the CPS records with validated SSNs.

23 Table A.1 provides some additional information on the results of the
24 verification. The table stratifies by validated and unvalidated years. For
25 each set of years, we report the distribution of correspondence by gender and
26 age. Note that the match rates improve with validation. For the validated
27 data, we accept 95 percent of the matches; while for the unvalidated data, we
28 accept 92 percent of the matches. The matches deemed rejected are entered in
29 italics.

1 **Table A.1**
 2 **Age Differential (CPS Age - MEDS Age)**
 3 **(Percent within Validation Status)**

Gender Match	Validated		Unvalidated	
	Yes	No	Yes	NO
--	1%	0%	2%	2%
-1	2%		4%	
0	91%	1%	84%	1%
+1	2%		4%	
++	2%	1%	3%	0%

4 Note: Rows are age difference (CPS Age -
 5 MEDS Age). CPS age is as per response at
 6 survey; MEDS age computed based on birth date
 7 and CPS interview date.

8 "--" MEDS age is greater than CPS age by
 9 two or more years; "-1" MEDS age is greater
 10 than CPS age by exactly one year; "0" MEDS
 11 age equals CPS age; "+1" CPS age is older
 12 than MEDS age by exactly one year; "++" CPS
 13 age is older than MEDS age by more than two
 14 or more years for gender match and
 15 discrepancy for no gender match.

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