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EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT AND MOBILITY AMONG BLACK AND WHITE IMMIGRANTS IN THE POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA

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The Immigration Act of 1965, which eliminated national origins as a means for determining eligibility for admittance into the United States, in combination with worldwide economic development (Massey 1998, 1995) have at once revitalized and changed the complexion of migrant flows to the United States. Prior to this time Europeans had been predominant among newcomers. Since 1965, however, European migrants have become practically invisible in a brown-faced stream from third world to first—from Asia and Latin America to the United States. There is yet another group often overlooked in discussions of recent immigration—Black immigrants. Immigration from the Caribbean and African nations has grown dramatically in the last 40 years as can be seen in Figure 1. European immigration has been relatively stable during this time—hovering around one million per decade. Thus, while Asian and Latin American immigrants have been predominant among Post-Civil Rights Era immigrants, European and, increasingly, African and Caribbean immigrants have comprised a significant share of the foreign-born population.

****Figure 1 about here****

European- and African-descended immigrants are thrust into a context in which Europeans are "White" and Africans are "Black"—distinctions of profound ideological and practical significance. Whether or not the immigrants themselves internalize these labels, Blackness may work to the detriment Caribbean and African immigrants, and Whiteness may work to the benefit of European immigrants. Thusly, we might expect to find different patterns

of mobility between Black and White immigrant groups. In this paper, I attempt to assess the plausibility of this expectation with regards to education. In other words, I seek to answer the question, are the children of immigrants able to maintain or improve upon the educational attainments of their parents, and is their ability to do so influenced by race? This is a crucial question, since, as a long line of distinguished scholars have shown, education is a pivotal element in social and economic status attainment processes in the United States (Lipset and Bendix 1960; Blau and Duncan 1967; Featherman and Hauser 1978; Hout 1988).

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The more education one attains, the more success she will experience in other areas and other times of her life. The very meritocratic tone of this proposition is reflective of the *technical-function theory* of education outlined by Randall Collins (1971). Formal education is, from this perspective a means for providing sufficiently learned workers in an evermore technically sophisticated society. It is simply a means for preparing workers and citizens for life in their society(s). However, others have suggested that there is more to it than this. Formal education may be a vehicle to technical training but it may also be a vehicle for social class reproduction (Bowles and Gintis 1981; Apple 1990, 1982; Collins 1971). If there is any truth to this, there is reason to expect that Black and White immigrants may have different experiences in American schools, leading to different outcomes. Social class reproduction means, among other things, the maintenance of the American racial order (Omi and Winant 1987)--an order that may have no other place for Caribbean and African immigrants than in the "Black" category. This possibility has spawned new literatures in the areas of immigration and assimilation.

Early theorists (see Park 1950) saw assimilation as practically inevitable and largely beneficial to the social and economic well-being of immigrants and their off-spring. However, contemporary theorists have questioned both the extent to which assimilation is inevitable and the extent to which it is beneficial (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Metzger 1971). Herbert Gans (1992) speculates that the experiences of the new (Post-1965) second generation will be characterized by more downward social mobility than was true of the early twentieth century (largely European) immigrants because deindustrialization has left American cities largely devoid of the blue collar work immigrant populations have traditionally depended upon and because the new second generation is largely non-White—implying that White immigrants, even in the post-Civil Rights Era, may have advantages over non-White immigrants. This possibility led Gans and others to suggest that traditional assimilation theories may not capture very well the experience of recent waves of immigrants nor those of their children. George Borjas (1999) seems to agree, but for different reasons. He suggests that the third-world origins of many recent immigrants—specifically, their lack of human and cultural capital—will preclude their socioeconomic assimilation. What alternative theories might provide guidance as we attempt to map the future of the new second generation?

In answer to this question Portes and Zhou (1993) have pioneered *segemented assimilation theory*, echoing Gans' sentiment that the future of the new second generation may have a significantly different trajectory (or set of trajectories) than that of the children of immigrants earlier in the twentieth century. However, the second generation is not, in their view, necessarily doomed. Their experience depends on how well they are received in the United States. Portes and Rumbaut (2001) argue that it is important to consider governmental, societal and coethnic community responses to the arrival and presence of any immigrant group if we

wish to fully understand its pattern of adaptation. I argue that of these receiving entities, societal reception is the most crucial in understanding differences we may observe between Black and White immigrants because this type of reception is influenced by pervasive prejudices in American society that may influence the quality of their daily lives and, ultimately, their life chances. Government responses tend to have diminishing impacts on the live of immigrants the longer they stay in the United States; the protective effects of coethnic communities may have only limited effectiveness when young people venture out of them to find work or go to school. American racism, however, tends to find its way into the lives of American minorities (particularly those of African descent) no matter where they are (Feagin 1991). All else being equal, patterns of reception probably work to the advantage of White immigrants vis-à-vis Black immigrants.

Mary Waters' (1999) work bears this out. She finds, for instance, that while Black immigrants are favored over native Blacks in the workplace, White New Yorkers seem to flee their neighborhoods when upwardly mobile Blacks, *irrespective of nativity*, move in. This drives property values down creating fertile ground for many of the maladies that plague the older ghettoes of New York City. Among these maladies are poorly funded, hypersegregated schools that put immigrant off-spring in close contact with native-born Blacks—much to the dismay of many immigrant parents who fear that theirs and their children's optimism will be trumped by the oppositional culture of the ghetto (Obgu 1991).

Nancy Lopez (2003) maintains that gender is a crucial part of this story as well. By way of participant observation and in-depth interviews research in one of New York City's public high schools, she finds that educational experiences can be very different for the young men and women of the Black second generation. While they both experience disadvantage in school, the

quality of the disadvantage differs by gender as do responses and outcomes. Essentially, teachers and administrators see Caribbean (descended) boys as menacing and uncooperative. This leads teachers and administrators to take a default position that is defensive, even punitive. There is little quality interaction between these boys and their teachers that is not negative in some way. Resultingly, Lopez argues, the boys disengage. Girls have very different experience. While teachers' expectations are not high for them either, the default stance teachers take toward girls seems to be much more receptive (not defensive or punitive). Girls in this particular high school are encouraged to participate in a school-to-work program whereby they alternate school and work (for pay) every other week. They are graded on their course work and also on their wage work. The program places most of its participants in low-skill clerical and service jobs--including office work but also the fast food industry. Resultingly, girls are more engaged in school but not in ways that will drastically improve their station in the long run. It is hard to imagine that White immigrants would be subject to the same stereotypes and classroom dynamics.

Both Waters (1999) and Lopez (2003) consider only the circumstances of Black immigrants in New York City. Since about half of the Black immigrant population in the United States resides in and around New York City these findings speak loudly to the state of the Black immigrant population in the United States. The fact that the other half lives outside the New York City area warrants a broader look at Black immigrants around the country.

The most logical prediction to be drawn from recent theories and empirical findings is that *Black immigrants will experience a less favorable pattern of educational mobility than will White immigrants in the Post-Civil Rights Era* as was true earlier in the twentieth century (Lieberson 1980). They will be treated (or mistreated as it were) as Black. Their families will

experience residential and school segregation (Waters 1999). They will, as students, face teachers who speak to them only when they are in trouble (Lopez 2003; Grant 1985). They will be disproportionately placed into non-academic and remedial curriculum tracks (Rosenbaum 1976). And, finally, they will achieve less than their White peers, and perhaps even less than their immigrant parents.

There is, however, considerable research literature that counters this prediction. Thomas Sowell (1981) points out that West Indian immigration is not entirely a Post-Civil Right Era phenomenon. The first considerable waves of immigration took place in the first quarter of the twentieth century such that by the 1920's nearly one quarter of Harlem's population was of West Indian origins. Unlike the Black migrants moving northward during the same era, West Indians were disproportionately urban and white-collar in their origins putting them at a significant advantage. By 1970, West Indians had out-performed American-born Blacks on numerous socioeconomic measures (education, income, occupation), and *in the second generation*, they seemed even to outperform American-born Whites. More recently, Farley and Alba (2002) found that second generation "Afro-Caribbeans" are doing significantly better than their immigrant parents in terms of educational attainment, occupational attainment and income. While both of these studies provide compelling evidence that Black immigrants to the United States experience significant upward mobility between the first and second generations, neither compares that pattern to those of White immigrant groups—an essential step for assessing the impact of race on life chances in America.

DATA AND METHODS

The primary goals here are to gauge the extent to which the children of immigrants out-perform their parents in terms of education and the extent to which this is influenced by race. This is difficult because there no national data sets matching parents with their adult children that are large enough to generate sufficient samples of Black immigrants. Thusly, use unmatched data to construct "youth" and "parental" generations comprised of younger respondents and respondents "old enough to be their parents," respectively. Thusly, we can assess intergenerational mobility only as it is reflect in the improvement of younger persons over the achievements of not their parents but rather those of their parents' generation.

The Data

The Current Population Survey (Annual Demographic File) will be the primary source of data in this study. It is uniquely suited for studies immigrant mobility because it is one of a very few large national surveys that asks respondents questions regarding their own place of birth *as well as that of their parents*. Each year roughly 60,000 randomly chosen households are included in the CPS sample—30,000 new households and 30,000 households from the previous year—yielding total samples of about 130,000 individuals.[1] Since Black immigrants comprise a very small proportion of the American population multiple years of CPS data are required to get Black immigrant samples sufficiently large to yield generalizable results. Analyses in this study will, therefore, employ a single file comprised of four years of CPS data (1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002). Odd years are skipped so that no individual is in the sample twice. It is important to note

[1] This number increased substantially after the year 2000 such that more than 200,000 individuals were surveyed in 2002.

that, unlike the Census, the Current Population Survey is administered in-person whenever possible. This has unpredictable but not unimportant implications for racial classification.

The Problem of Identity

Given the stated hypotheses, only Black and White samples are called for, but who is Black? Who is White? Answers to these questions are elusive because of the way race is treated in the CPS. We know that racial identity is highly situational (Harris 2002) so the fact that the race question is asked—like all other CPS questions and unlike Census questions—*in person* is not trivial. When interviewers record responses to the race question we have no way of knowing how much of his/her perceptions influence what he/she writes down; nor can we know exactly how the perceptions of the respondent bear on their answering of the question. This problem is compounded by the fact that there are only four categories that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive: White, African American or Black, Asian, and American Indian. These categories are mutually exclusive in that respondents may only be identified as a member of one of these four categories and exhaustive in that 100% of the respondents fall into one of these four categories![2]

The lack of an "other" category forces respondents and interviewers to "compromise" on racial identity. This has resulted in a large phenotypically diverse White population that includes German, English, and Canadian as well as large numbers of Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Dominicans (to name a few). This may significantly change the profile of the White CPS sample—making it look worse than it really is. This is less problematic for the Black sample since conceptions of race in Latin America—the primary source of "non-White Whites"—dictate

[2] Beginning last year (2003) the CPS allowed respondents to identify with more than one race in accordance with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Directive 15.

that only those of very dark complexion are likely to identify as Black when given a choice between White and Black. These problems are partly ameliorated by excluding Hispanics from most analyses.

The Sample

Race, age, nativity and year of immigration also serve as selection criteria and as a means to create generational relevant comparison groups using the Current Population Survey data. For reasons outlined in the prior section, only those respondents who were identified as Black non-Hispanic or White non-Hispanic on the CPS race question are included in the sample. Only respondents 25 years of age and older are included because the hypotheses to be tested here implicate only adults—for only adults have gone as far as they are likely to go in terms of formal schooling, and only adults are likely to head their own households and thus have some voice in where their households are located.

However, not all adults are included. There are five groups whose members are included in the sample: first generation, second generation, second generation "mixed," third+ generation[3], and third+ generation parents. Because this study examines immigrant adaptation in the post-Civil Rights Era the *first generation* group includes only foreign-born respondents (of foreign born parentage)[4] who entered the country after 1960[5], are old enough and have been in

[3] Without origins data for respondents' grandparents and great-grandparents we have no way of knowing whether American-born respondents of American-born parentage are third generation or thirteenth. Hence, the term "third+ generation."

[4] Foreign-born respondents of American-born parents are likely to be children of military personnel whose experience is not an immigrant experience in the strictest sense so they are also treated as members of the third(+) generation.

[5] The 1960's were a landmark decade in a number of ways. It was the decade that saw the amendment of the Immigration Act (1965) in a way that essentially opened the United States to immigration streams previously prohibited by U.S. immigration policy. It was also the decade that a particularly important Civil Rights Act was passed which outlawed public place and employment discrimination on the basis of race. Further, Europe's

the country long enough to have adult American born children, but in an age range that makes unlikely that they would have children older than forty. The *second generation* consists of those who are American-born but have two foreign-born parents and are between the 25 and 39 years of age—the only group of second generation Americans who could be the children of post-Civil Right Era immigrants. The *"mixed" second generation* consists of those who are American-born but have only one foreign-born parent and are between the 25 and 39 years of age. The *Third+ generation* ("children" or "youth") group includes those American-born respondents who are of American-born parentage and between 25 and 39 years of age while *third+ generation parents* are identical except with respects to age. These categories are summarized in the table below.

****Table 1 about here****

Only 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002 Current Population Survey Black and White respondents who fall into one of these categories are included in the sample—leaving 212,633 relevant cases[6] of which the overwhelming majority are third generation or more. First (2,049) and second (4,943) generation samples appear nonetheless sufficiently large to yield generalizable results. This is less true when the data are disagreggated by race, but we will see that there are a number of instances in which intergenerational and racial differences are large enough to overcome limitations imposed by small sample sizes.

****Table 2 about here****

reconstruction economy compelled many would-be emigrants to stay while America's economy became more visible and more accessible to migrants from other parts of the world.

[6] The full sample (all cases from 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002) has 613,022 cases.

Dependent Variables

Measures of education are much more straight-forward. The Current Population Survey asks respondents a single question whose responses are coded into sixteen categories ranging from "less than first grade" to "doctorate degree."[7] For the purposes of this study three different variables were created from this single item to more completely assess educational attainment. First, to create a "years of education" variable, each of the sixteen categories were assigned a value equal to the midpoint of the category's range[8] yielding a continuous measure of educational attainment. A short coming of such a measure is that it may obscure any polarities that exist in the distributions of educational attainment. That is, an average of 12 years may mean that half the population has 8 "years of education" and the other half has 16 years which is profoundly different from one in which everyone has 12 "years of education". For this reason, I employ two categorical measures as well. One is a dichotomous measure of high school graduation and the other is a dichotomous measure of college graduation. Patterns of performance may be different at high and low levels of education and may have different determinants and implications for this study. For these reasons all three measures are examined here.

Independent Variables

The two central independent variables, race and nativity, have been addressed at length, but there are other factors which may be integral to the processes of educational achievement and mobility. Unfortunately, many of them are not captured in the CPS data. The social

[7] The question reads "What is the highest level of school … has completed or the highest degree … has received?"
[8] For instance, the second category, "1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th grade" was assigned a value of "2.5" (years) while the fourth category, "9th grade" was assigned the value "9" and the last category, "doctorate degree" was assigned the value "20."

psychological predictors of success outlined by the Wisconsin school (see Haller and Portes 1973) are absent from these analyses due to data limitations. However, there are more commonplace demographic/compositional measures which may partly explain between-group differences in educational performance. Three such factors are included here: sex, residence in the New York City consolidated metropolitan statistical area (CMSA), and residence in a central city.[9]

*****Table 3 about here****

Sex composition of the various race-nativity groups may influence the relationship(s) between race, nativity and education. It has been established that educational performance is significantly higher among Black women than Black men in the United States (Slater 1994) so the fact that Black second and third generations are disproportionately female may bear significantly on the questions at issue in this paper.[10] To eliminate this possibility *separate analyses are performed for men and women*. The findings of Lopez (2003) as well as those displayed in Table 3 serve as further justification for a gendered approach. Perhaps the most compelling statistics are in the second column ("% Coll Grad") where it appears in the combined ("TOTAL") analysis that Black second generation (%39) is considerably more likely to graduate college that members of the Black first generation (%26). However, the when college graduation rates are examined by gender it becomes clear that the intergenerational increase in college graduation among Black immigrants is almost entirely a function of very low rates of college

[9] Age is also an important consideration, but its inclusion as an additional covariate complicates matters beyond its worth (see Appendix).
[10] This compositional bias makes Black groups, and particularly the men in those groups, appear better off than they really are.

graduation among Black immigrant women (22%) and very high rates among Black second generation women (45%). Black second generation men seem to have made little or no progress on this measure registering 31% college graduation rate—a figure only one percentage point higher than that of Black immigrant men. Thusly, men and women are treated separately in the analysis to follow.

****Table 4 about here****

Place of residence may also have important influences on the lives of immigrants and their children. Explorations of the experiences of Black immigrants in New York City (Lopez 2003; Waters 1999) beg the question: how much of what is captured—residential and school segregation and neighborhood denigration—is peculiar to New York City? Table 4 indicates that half of Black first and second generation cohorts reside in the New York CMSA. White immigrant populations appear more diffuse but still highly concentrated in New York as well. This is an important consideration in examining their relative levels of educational attainment. However, *which* city one resides in may have less effect than the simple fact of living in *any* central city area. Whereas, only about one-quarter of the White immigrant population resides in central city areas, over half of the Black immigrant population resides in such places. This too may color our view of educational attainment and mobility among the two groups. Thus, residence in the New York City CMSA and residence in a central city area will be accounted for in the multivariate analysis to follow.

Table 4 also demonstrates that mean age does not vary a great deal across race. For instance, the first generation groups (both Black and White) have mean ages of about 56 years.

The second generation groups do, however, differ significantly across racial lines. While among Whites second generation and second generation "mixed" groups have mean ages of 32.5 and 32.7 years, respectively, Black second generation groups have means of 30.1 and 31.3. This would be of concern if age had significant influence on education, but, between the ages of 25 and 39, it does not. Therefore, while the difference is noted, age is not included in the analysis to follow.

Bivariate analyses will be employed to identify differences in educational attainment and mobility among Black and White immigrants. These comparisons may, by themselves, contribute significantly to our understanding of stratification processes in Post-Civil Rights America. We will, nonetheless, employ ordinary least squares and logistic regressions to assess patterns of educational attainment and mobility net of the residential considerations discussed above to gain a more nuanced understanding of educational attainment and mobility among Black and White immigrants in the United States.

RESULTS

The disaggregation of results by gender complicates the presentation of an already enormous amount of statistical information, so I will take a moment to articulate my presentational plan. Following are six pages of coefficients from regressions predicting years of education completed, college graduation, high school graduation for men and women. Each of these (six) tables is comprised of results from three model estimations: one with only race-nativity variables, another that adds "place of residence" variables, and a third and final model which adds interaction terms for race-nativity and residence variables. Since intergenerational and interracial patterns are similar for all three outcome variables, results from Model 1 for all

three outcomes (years of education, college graduation, and high school graduation) will be discussed first. Next results from Model 2 for all three outcomes will be discussed. Lastly, the place of interactions in all of this will be taken up as we examine results from Model 3 results. To aid interpretation of statistical results presented in Tables 5 through 10, Figures 2 through 7 have been constructed to provide the reader a graphic representation of the relative position of each group on each outcome. This strategy will allow me to speak with clarity and (statistical) confidence about the relative impacts of race, nativity and residence on educational outcomes.

****Tables 5 through 10 about here****

The bivariate results presented in Table 3 must be taken with a grain of salt as they may reflect real intergroup differences, but they may reflect compositional differences between the groups and/or sample biases. Figures 2 through 7 present confidence intervals rather than point estimates to alleviate some of this uncertainty. Where confidence intervals visibly overlap we cannot reject the null hypothesis. We will see that the small sizes of Black immigrant groups make for large confidence intervals and, in turn, undermine our ability to generalize their results to larger populations. Despite this fact intergenerational and racial disparities are in some cases large enough to meet conventional statistical significance criteria.

****Figure 2 about here****

Figures 2 through 4 plot confidence intervals (based on point estimates) from Model 1 in Tables 5 through 10. In effect, these figures offer a bivariate look at the relationship between

race-nativity and educational attainment. The first of these—Figure 2—provides results for "years of education" (Tables 5 and 6). A cursory glance at Figure 2, gives the impression that intergenerational patterns of educational attainment are similar across race and gender: younger groups have gotten more education than older groups. There are, however, some noteworthy differences. Look closely at the intervals for the first and second generation groups. For all groups except Black men, there is a clear pattern of upward mobility (i.e., no overlap in the first and second generation confidence intervals). Consistent with findings in Table 3, the intergenerational improvement is much greater for women than for men. Second generation White women, have completed about two more years of schooling than their mothers' generation. For Black women the improvement is about one year at a minimum, but may be as much as two and a half years. While the gap is not as large, both Black and White second generation women have attained significantly more education than their fathers as well as their mothers. White second generation men have improved on their fathers' educational attainments by .8 to 1.5 years. Any intergenerational improvement observed among Black men in this sample, however, is not statistically significant as the overlapping intervals of first and second generations indicate. So while Black second generation women have outperformed their fathers' generation, Black men of the second generation have not. Second generation respondents seem to have outperformed "mixed" (one American-born and one foreign-born parent) cohorts though not to a statistically significant degree. In all cases the children of immigrants have outperformed the children of native-born parents.

****Figure 3 about here****

Confidence intervals mapped in Figure 3 are calculated using point estimates presented in Model 1 of Tables 7 and 8 which predict college graduation. A similar pattern of upward mobility is evident among women on this measure; the second generation is significantly more likely than the first to have graduated from college. This is particularly true for White women among which 21 to 26% of the first generation is college educated and 41 to 48% of the second generation is college educated. 18 to 28% of Black immigrant women are college educated, and 37 to 54% of Black second generation women are so schooled. Black and White immigrant women are not significantly different from one another on this measure. Black and White second generation women are not significantly different on this measure either, but the difference between Black and White first and second generations is unmistakable. Finally, it is important to point out that both Black and White second generation groups are significantly more likely than the men of their fathers' generations to have graduated from college.

Men, on the other hand, have not experienced significant intergenerational improvement in terms of college completion. 32 to 39% of White immigrant men have completed college while 37 to 43% of their sons' generation has done so. The mixed White second generation has a similar interval of 35 to 40%. While it is likely that the children of the White immigrant men do better than the immigrant themselves on this measure we I cannot say so with much confidence. Recall that Table 3 reports only a one percentage point difference between Black first and second generation men on this measure (30% versus 31%). This similarity is even more pronounced when confidence intervals are drawn about point estimates from Model 1 in Tables 7 and 8. Among Black men, the first generation interval falls entirely within the bounds of the second generation intervals—suggesting strongly that there has been no significant intergenerational improvement for Black men on this measure. Table 3 suggests that all groups

of White men are more likely to graduated college than all groups of Black men, and while this is probably the case, the overlapping intervals of Black and White groups negates the statistical significance of those observed differences. We cannot, then, safely say that the racial differences observed here are not a function of sample bias.

As in the case of "years of education," the second generation cohorts have, as a rule, performed at least as well as the children of (two) American-born parents. We turn now to Figure 4 to determine whether similar patterns prevail with regards to high school completion.

****Figure 4 about here****

Coefficients from Model 1 of Tables 9 and 10 are used to calculate probabilities of high school graduation with 90% confidence intervals about them. These intervals are, in turn, mapped in Figure 4. Once again we can easily see convincing evidence of intergenerational improvement for all but one group—Black men. White women and men of the first generation have a probability of having graduated high school in the neighbor of .8 (80%) while there American-born sons and daughters have probabilities well above .9 (90%). Despite small sample sizes, the daughters of Black immigrants appear to have done significantly better on this measure than Black immigrant women themselves (i.e., their confidence intervals do not overlap). The same cannot be said of mixed Black second generation women. Nor are Black second generation (83 to 95%) statistically more likely than men of their fathers generation (76 to 87%) to graduate high school. The fact that as many as one in six second generation Black men could be competing in the labor force (or not) without a high school diploma may have profound negative influences on their lives and life chances, and this stands in stark contrast to

White second generation men among whom one in eleven (at the most) have not attained a high school diploma. Of the three measures, high school graduation is the only one on which children of the American-born have fared as well as the children of immigrants.

In all, it is fair to say that there is convincing evidence of intergenerational improvement on educational measures for White men and women as well as Black women, but not for Black men.

As was mentioned earlier, intergenerational and interracial patterns of mobility and attainment may reflect that fact that immigrants and Blacks are more likely than others to reside in the New York CMSA and in central cities, more generally. However, coefficients for the dichotomous measures of residence in New York and residence in a central city (see Model 2 in Tables 5 through 10) are universally positive (and, with one exception, universally significant). So the fact that Blacks and Immigrants are overrepresented in New York and central cities, generally, may not explain away any part of the educational deficit of immigrant and Black groups (vis-á-vis White and native-born groups) but rather add to the deficit. We might, however, expect the inclusion of residential variables to draw White young people (25 to 29) of American-born parents (third+ generation) closer to their second generation counterparts who are overrepresented in New York and central cities, generally. (The same would be true of Black third+ generation young people were they not also overrepresented in New York and central cities, generally.) Figures 5 through 7 are constructed using coefficients from Model 2 in Tables 5 through 10, which controls for residence in the New York CMSA and/or any central city, to display patterns of educational attainment and mobility across race and nativity groups net of residence. Figures 5 through 7 are virtually identical to Figures 2 through 4. While difference

between White third+ generation young people and their second generation counterparts decreases with the introduction of residential variables, the difference remains significant. All generalizations made on the basis of Figures 2 through 4 hold when the effects of residence are accounted for. Women experience more intergenerational mobility than men, and Black men experience none (that is statistically significant) at all.

****Figures 5 through 7 about here****

While there is good reason to expect that young White people living in cities score highly on measures of education, it is hard to imagine that the same reasoning applies to the majority of young Black people living in cities. Central cities are at once playgrounds for the well-to-do and detention centers for the impoverished where social distance may be great from neighborhood to neighborhood where physical distance is not. White people residing cities seem to be comprised disproportionately of highly educated, single, childless persons who can afford to reside in central cities but in areas that not deteriorating and/or dangerous (see Franklin 2003). Often they are the children and grandchildren of suburbanites who fled the city in decades prior. Black people who reside in central cities are more often children and grandchildren of central city residents and who remain in the city due partly to patterns of residential exclusion (see Massey and Denton 1993) in suburbs and more desirable metropolitan locations and partly to their desire to remain in familiar Black communities. In any case, Black residence in central cities is less likely to be volitional and transient than is true of White residence in the central city. Whites may be more likely wooed by the amusements of the city; Blacks may be more likely mired in the maladies of the city. Thusly, we might expect to find that central city residence and

residence in the New York CMSA is more positively associated with educational attainment among White groups than is true among Black groups.

For the sake of easy, interpretation only years of education will be examined here. Also, the discussion will not differentiate the experiences of women and men. Table 11 displays results from the interaction models predicting years of education—one for women, one for men, and one for all respondents. We are mainly concerned here with coefficients for residential variables and their interactions with race-nativity (essentially the lower two-thirds of the table). Note that, with few exceptions, the valence and magnitude of these coefficients are the same or similar for men and women. This being the case, it makes sense to look at only one model—that which includes both men and women. The following discussion is based on results presented in the third column from the left in Table 11.

****Table 11 about here****

Residence in New York CMSA adds an average of three-quarters (.77) of a year to the educational attainment to members of the referent group—White third+ generation parents (45-69). Another way to think about this is the older White natives who live in New York tend to be the ones with more education. The same can be can said of their children whose coefficient (-.07) is not statistically significant meaning that the effect living in New York has on White third+ generation young persons is not significantly different than the effect living in New York has on White third+ generation parents. However, White third+ generation groups are the only ones that seem to be positively selected on education for residence in the New York CMSA. All other race-nativity groups fare no better and in some cases worse than there non-New York

counterparts. This especially true of White immigrants for whom residence in New York is associated with a year's (.77 + [-1.76]) loss in educational attainment and Black immigrants among whom residence in New York is associated with a half-year (.77 + [-1.31]) deficit in educational attainment. The remaining groups seem to fare no better or worse than those who live outside of New York. As was discussed in the previous chapter, the New York CMSA is comprised of central city and suburban counties in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut so its inclusion here is motivated more by curiosity than by theory. We know that Black and White Immigrants are heavily concentrated in the New York CMSA, but we have not known whether and how this matters. On the basis of these results residence in New York is positively associated with educational attainment for White third+ generation cohorts, negatively associated with educational attainment for Black and White first generation cohorts, and moot for everyone else.

Central city residence is included here because of the voluminous literature on the effects of central city residence on minority populations (see Wilson 1987 & 1989; Jencks & Peterson 1991). Residence in the New York CMSA may be a less salient consideration in assessing the life chances of immigrants and their offspring than residence in *any* central city. However, Table 11 does not support this argument. Central city residence is positively associated with educational attainment in the referent group (White third+ generation parents) to a degree (.63 years) roughly equivalent to the effect of New York CMSA residence (.77 years). The effect is not significantly different for the other White groups except in the case of the White first generation whose members gain, on average, a half-year less for living in the central city but still do at least as well as their "country cousins" in terms of educational attainment. For Black groups the story is quite different; they all gain significantly less for living in central cities, and,

in fact, central city residence is negatively associated with educational achievement. In four out of five Black groups, the corresponding interaction terms are negative and larger (-1.36 to -.73) than the positive term associated with the referent group (+.63) indicating small net losses associated with central city residence for Blacks. This is most pronounced in the Black second generation which appears to be at a half- to three-quarter-year deficit vis-á-vis their suburban counterparts.

****Table 12 about here****

While small sample sizes do not allow for a direct analysis of the effects living in New York's central city, we can get a rough idea by adding the effects of living in the New York CMSA to the effects of living in a central city. Using point estimates from the third column in Table 11 we can calculate an estimate of the relative advantage/ disadvantage in years of education associated with residence in New York's central city. The estimates are listed in Table 12 and suggest that residence in New York's central city is positively associated with education for White groups (except for White immigrants). This is most true of White natives among whom New York central city residents have 1.3 to 1.4 *more* years of schooling than White natives outside of New York City. The opposite is true of Blacks for whom residence in New York City is negatively associated with education.[11] This is especially true of Black second generation groups among whom New York central city residents have .75 to .83 *less* years of schooling than Black second generation cohorts living outside of New York City.

[11] Except in the case of Black third+ generation parents who experience small [.27] positive effect.

In sum, results here suggest strongly that intergenerational mobility is happening for White women, White men, and Black women but not for Black men. Women have outperformed both their mothers' and fathers' generations in terms of years of schooling completed, college graduation and high school graduation. For men the intergenerational gains are smaller (owing partly to the relatively high educational attainments of their fathers) and, in the case of Black men, not statistically significant. These race, nativity and gender disparities remain intact when place of residence is controlled. While the effects of living in the New York CMSA and/or any central city area are positively associated with education, these effects vary by race and nativity. Residing in New York's central city is positively associated with educational attainment for most white groups—particularly third+ generation groups—and negatively associated with educational attainment for most Black groups—particularly second generation groups.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

There are good reasons to think that immigrants of the Post-Civil Rights Era have more difficult time advancing economically than immigrants of the early twentieth century. American industry has waned while American systems of racial and ethnic prejudice have persisted. To the extent that this is true, gaining a toe-hold in the American economy is more difficult for recent immigrants who are disproportionately non-White. These barriers may be partly overcome by way of (higher) education. Fortunately, while occupational opportunities may be in short supply, educational opportunities are not. This paper has been an attempt to assess the extent to which Black and White immigrants have accessed and exploited these opportunities.

Classic assimilation theories have predicted that immigrants to the United States would over the course of generations become more "American" and experience social and economic successes in direct proportion to their "Americaness." The expectation that immigrants would assimilate in this manner stems from the fact that immigrants are a select group willing to sacrifice and struggle for the betterment of their lot. This should be no less true of Post-Civil Rights Era immigrants than it is of Pre-WWI Era immigrants. So we might expect to see an intergenerational pattern of advancement between first and second generation cohorts accompanied by a pattern of increasingly American lifeways. We might also expect to see, however, that this pattern is more reflective of the White experience since they are entering a society in which their skin color will not count against them as they seek to access America's most prized resources. In the case of educational attainment, then, we would expect that 1) the second generation will acquire more education than the first, 2) the more "American" a group is[12] the more education that group will acquire, and 3) White groups will experience a more favorable pattern of educational advancement than Black groups. This discussion will address each of these hypotheses in light of the findings presented in this paper.

The first prediction finds limited support. The children of Black and White immigrants of the Post-Civil Right Era have outperformed their parents, but this more true of women than of men. Further, among Black men, the intergenerational improvements observed here are not statistically significant. All of this is true net of compositional differences between the groups. I find no evidence of downward mobility here. The classic assimilation model seems to hold sway in the case of women and Whites, but the case lack of significant improvement on the part of the second generation Black men calls into question the plausibility of that model for Black men.

[12] "Americaness" is here defined by nativity and parents nativity.

However, that model suggests that cultural, structural and marital assimilation are typically associated with socioeconomic assimilation and upward mobility. Put another way, immigrants become successful by becoming American and become more American (and less "ethnic") by becoming successful. If this is true, we should expect to find that young people who are American-born and have American-born parents are the most successfully adapted, most socially and economically successful young people. Those with one foreign-born parent and one American-born parent would be at a slight disadvantage, and those with two foreign-born parents would fair the least well of all three groups. However, with regards to education, the opposite pattern is evidenced. Second generation cohorts with two foreign-born parents appear to fare better than those with only one foreign-born parent, and both of these groups fair better than third+ generation young people on all measures of education (save for high school graduation in which case they are not statistically different). Thus, while the predicted intergenerational advancement is born out here the mechanism for that advancement is less clear. The most successful young people in terms of educational attainment are those with the least American influences in their lives (families). The fact that second generation immigrants are more accomplished as a group than native-born Americans of native parentage suggests that assimilation and "Americaness" may not be positively related to success. Recent variations of assimilation theory—segmented assimilation most notably—have suggested that to acculturate (or culturally assimilate) for many immigrants means to trade a culture of "optimism" (see Kao and Tienda 1995), hard work, and discipline for an American culture that many immigrant parents see as self-destructive. The immigrant ethos is surely threatened as the number of its conduits in a community or family declines, and may come into competition with other more "oppositional" values, beliefs and norms (see Ogbu 1991). Old stock Americans were

outperformed in this study by immigrant offspring who disproportionately reside in central city areas where they may benefit from the protective effects of ethnic enclaves and communities. If this were the case we should expect to find that second generation immigrants benefit from central city residence, but it is found here that the opposite seems to be true; it is the less successful/educated among Black immigrant offspring who reside in central cities. This does not eliminate the possibility, however, that insulating effects of ethnic enclaves helped propel many now suburban Black second generation men and women to the educational successes that ultimately afforded them a wider range of residential options than their parents were exposed to. In short, while it is clear that the closer young people are to the immigrant experience, the better they do in terms of education, it is not clear why.

Finally, the matter of racial differences in intergenerational mobility: while there is considerable evidence of intergenerational improvement among women and Whites, there is no convincing evidence that Black second generation men are doing better than their fathers' generation. In terms of college graduation, is no discernable difference between first and second generation Black men. On a more positive note neither the first nor second generation appears significantly less likely to finish college than any group of White men. High school graduation is a different matter. While Black men of the first generation appear slightly more likely to have graduated high school than their White counterparts, Black men of the second generation may be as much as twice as likely as Whites to stop their schooling short of high school graduation. The relatively high levels of college graduation and high school dropout may reflect a bifurcation in the class distribution of Black immigrants whereby some ascend and/or maintain middle and upper class standing and others become mired in the ranks of the urban underclass.

One possible explanation of these racial differences is that educational attainments of Black immigrants are misleading because they tend to be educated at overseas institutions with little credibility in the U.S. labor markets. Thus, the children of highly educated Black immigrants may be in households headed by parents whose occupations and incomes are much lower than we might predict on the basis of "years of education" completed. However, this is probably not a complete explanation of the different rates of educational advancement between Black and White immigrant groups. Dodoo and Takyi (2002) compare *American-educated* Black and White African immigrants and find significant gap in earnings suggesting that "returns to education" are less for Black immigrants irrespective of where they have been educated.

In sum, many Black and White immigrants of the Post-Civil Rights Era have experienced substantial intergenerational (upward) mobility in terms of educational attainment. This movement has been more pronounced among women than men partly owing to the low status of first generation women and partly to the extraordinary achievements of women of the second generation. White men have also experienced significant educational advancement from the first generation to the second, but Black men have not. As we would expect, older cohorts (45-69) have completed less education than younger cohorts (25-39). However, coefficients and predicted values of educational attainment among second generation and third+ generation "youth" cohorts are arrayed in a way that runs counter to traditional assimilationist predictions. The American-born of two immigrant parents outperform those with only one-foreign born who, in turn, outperform the American-born of American-born parents. The question of "why?" can only be addressed speculatively here but is sure to elicit more empirical attention as data become available.

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Figure 1. Post-Depression Era Migration to the United States



Data Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service Statistical Yearbook, 2001

Figure 2. Mean Years of Education Completed with 95% Confidence Intervals by Race, Nativity and Gender



Data Source: CPS 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002

Notes: Confidence intervals depicted here are from Models ()in Tables (). 1G=first generation (45-54); 2G=second generation (25-39); 2Gm-second generation (25-39) of mixed parentage (Native- and Foreign-born); 3Gy=third generation youth (25-29); and 3Gp=Third Generation parents (45-54). Those 55 years of age and older are excluded because their disproportionate representation among the retired obscures generational comparisons.

Figure 3 . Probability of College Graduation with 90% Confidence Intervals by Race, Nativity and Gender



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Notes: Confidence intervals depicted here are from Models ()in Tables (). 1G=first generation (45-54); 2G=second generation (25-39); 2Gm-second generation (25-39) of mixed parentage (Native- and Foreign-born); 3Gy=third generation youth (25-29); and 3Gp=Third Generation parents (45-54). Those 55 years of age and older are excluded because their disproportionate representation among the retired obscures generational comparisons.

Figure 4 . Probability of High School Graduation with 90% Confidence Intervals by Race, Nativity and Gender



Data Source: CPS 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002

Notes: Confidence intervals depicted here are from Models () in Tables (). 1G=first generation (45-54); 2G=second generation (25-39); 2Gm-second generation (25-39) of mixed parentage (Native- and Foreign-born); 3Gy=third generation youth (25-29); and 3Gp=Third Generation parents (45-54). Those 55 years of age and older are excluded because their disproportionate representation among the retired obscures generational comparisons.

Figure 5. Mean Years of Education Completed with 95% Confidence Intervals by Race, Nativity and Gender Net of Residential Status



Data Source: CPS 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002

Notes: Confidence intervals depicted here are from Models ()in Tables (). 1G=first generation (45-54); 2G=second generation (25-39); 2Gm-second generation (25-39) of mixed parentage (Native- and Foreign-born); 3Gy=third generation youth (25-29); and 3Gp=Third Generation parents (45-54). Those 55 years of age and older are excluded because their disproportionate representation among the retired obscures generational comparisons.

Figure 6 . Probability of College Graduation with 90% Confidence Intervals by Race, Nativity and Gender Net of Residential Status



Data Source: CPS 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002

Notes: Confidence intervals depicted here are from Models ()in Tables (). 1G=first generation (45-54); 2G=second generation (25-39); 2Gm-second generation (25-39) of mixed parentage (Native- and Foreign-born); 3Gy=third generation youth (25-29); and 3Gp=Third Generation parents (45-54). Those 55 years of age and older are excluded because their disproportionate representation among the retired obscures generational comparisons.

Figure 7 . Probability of High School Graduation with 90% Confidence Intervals by Race, Nativity and Gender Net of Residential Status



Data Source: CPS 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002

Notes: Confidence intervals depicted here are from Models ()in Tables (). 1G=first generation (45-54); 2G=second generation (25-39); 2Gm-second generation (25-39) of mixed parentage (Native- and Foreign-born); 3Gy=third generation youth (25-29); and 3Gp=Third Generation parents (45-54). Those 55 years of age and older are excluded because their disproportionate representation among the retired obscures generational comparisons.

Table 1. Selection Criteria and Counts for Three Immigrant Generations in the CPS

	Time of Arrival	*Place of Birth (POB)*	*Mother's POB*		*Father's POB*	*Age*	*n*
First Generation (45-69)	1965 to 1974	Foreign	Foreign	AND	Foreign	45 to 39	2,049
Second Generation (25-39)[1]	na	USA	Foreign	AND	Foreign	25 to 39	1,756
Second Generation Mixed (25-39)	na	USA	Foreign	OR	Foreign	25 to 39	3,187
Third+ Generation(25-39)[2]	na	USA	USA	AND	USA	25 to 39	93,902
Third+ Generation(45-69)	na	USA	USA	AND	USA	45 to 69	111,739
							212,633

[1]Second generation groups also include foreign-born persons who migrated to the U.S. (with their foreign-born parents) prior to the age of six.
[2]Third generation groups also include foreign-born person of American-born parents.

Table 2. Nativity by Race (Hispanics excluded)

	White	Black	Total
First Generation (45-69)[1]	1,687	362	2,049
Second Generation (25-39)[2]	1,584	172	1,756
Second Generation Mixed (25-39)[3]	3,020	167	3,187
Third+ generation(25-39)	82,161	11,741	93,902
Third+ generation(45-69)	98,516	13,223	111,739
	186,968	25,665	212,633

Data Source: CPS Annual Demographic File 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002

Table 3. Educational Attainment by Race and Nativity

	TOTAL		
	Yrs of Educ	*% Coll Grad*	*% HS Grad*
White			
First Generation (45-69)[1]	12.7	29%	80%
Second Generation (25-39)[2]	14.3	42%	95%
Second Generation Mixed (25-39)[3]	14.1	38%	95%
Third+ Generation(25-39)	13.7	30%	93%
Third+ Generation(45-69)	13.4	28%	89%
Black			
First Generation (45-69)[1]	12.9	26%	82%
Second Generation (25-39)[2]	14.2	39%	92%
Second Generation Mixed (25-39)[3]	13.8	31%	89%
Third+ Generation(25-39)	12.9	16%	88%
Third+ Generation(45-69)	12.3	15%	73%
	WOMEN		
	Yrs of Educ	*% Coll Grad*	*% HS Grad*
White			
First Generation (45-69)[1]	12.5	23%	81%
Second Generation (25-39)[2]	14.5	44%	97%
Second Generation Mixed (25-39)[3]	14.1	39%	95%
Third+ Generation(25-39)	13.7	31%	94%
Third+ Generation(45-69)	13.2	24%	89%
Black			
First Generation (45-69)[1]	12.7	22%	82%
Second Generation (25-39)[2]	14.5	45%	93%
Second Generation Mixed (25-39)[3]	13.9	33%	88%
Third+ Generation(25-39)	13.0	17%	88%
Third+ Generation(45-69)	12.4	16%	74%
	MEN		
	Yrs of Educ	*% Coll Grad*	*% HS Grad*
White			
First Generation (45-69)[1]	13.1	36%	78%
Second Generation (25-39)[2]	14.2	40%	93%
Second Generation Mixed (25-39)[3]	14.1	38%	95%
Third+ Generation(25-39)	13.6	30%	92%
Third+ Generation(45-69)	13.6	32%	89%
Black			
First Generation (45-69)[1]	13.1	30%	82%
Second Generation (25-39)[2]	13.8	31%	91%
Second Generation Mixed (25-39)[3]	13.7	27%	89%
Third+ Generation(25-39)	12.8	15%	88%
Third+ Generation(45-69)	12.1	15%	73%

[1]Includes only immigrants who arrived prior to 1975.
[2]Includes American-born respondents with two foreign-born parents.
[3]Includes American-born respondents with only one foreign-born parent.

Table 4. Demographic Characteristics by Race and Nativity

	Age	*% in NYC*	*% in Centrl Cty*
White			
First Generation (45-69)[1]	55.9	19%	26%
Second Generation (25-39)[2]	32.7	24%	26%
Second Generation Mixed (25-39)[3]	32.5	10%	22%
Third+ Generation(25-39)	32.6	5%	17%
Third+ Generation(45-69)	54.6	4%	14%
Black			
First Generation (45-69)[1]	56.2	51%	61%
Second Generation (25-39)[2]	30.1	50%	56%
Second Generation Mixed (25-39)[3]	31.3	19%	44%
Third+ Generation(25-39)	32.3	7%	47%
Third+ Generation(45-69)	55.1	8%	50%

Data Source: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 Annual Demographic Files from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
[1]Includes only immigrants who arrived between 1965 and 1975.
[2]Includes American-born respondents with two foreign-born parents.
[3]Includes American-born respondents with only one foreign-born parent.

Table 5. Unstandardized Coefficients from OLS Regression Predicting Years of Education Among Men

	Model 1 β	Model 2 β	Model 3 β
RACE AND NATIVITY			
White First Generation (45-69)[1]	-0.52 ***	-0.69 ***	-0.29 *
White Second Generation (25-39)[2]	0.61 ***	0.42 ***	0.59 ***
White Second Generation Mixed (25-39)	0.53 ***	0.45 ***	0.49 ***
White Third+ Generation (25-39)	0.01	-0.02	0.01
White Third+ Generation (45-69)	Referrent	Referrent	Referrent
Black First Generation (45-69)[1]	-0.49 *	-0.97 ***	-0.11
Black Second Generation (25-39)[2]	0.22	-0.25	0.91
Black Second Generation Mixed (25-39)	0.10	-0.18	0.47
Black Third+ Generation (25-39)	-0.79 ***	-1.00 ***	-0.61 ***
Black Third+ Generation (45-69)	-1.47 ***	-1.68 ***	-1.42 ***
DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS			
New York City CMSA (1=yes)		0.58 ***	0.87 ***
Central City Resident (1=yes)		0.58 ***	0.78 ***
INTERACTION TERMS			
Wht First Generation (45-69)*NYC			-1.93 ***
Wht Second Generation (25-39)*NYC			-0.76 **
Wht Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*NYC			-0.55 *
Wht Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*NYC			-0.22 *
Wht Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*NYC			Referrent
Blk First Generation (45-69)*NYC			-1.63 ***
Blk Second Generation (25-39)*NYC			-1.43 *
Blk Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*NYC			-0.15
Blk Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*NYC			-0.82 ***
Blk Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*NYC			-0.59 ***
Wht First Generation (45-69)*CC			-0.28
Wht Second Generation (25-39)*CC			-0.29
Wht Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*CC			-0.09
Wht Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*CC			-0.15 **
Wht Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*CC			Referrent
Blk First Generation (45-69)*CC			-0.57
Blk Second Generation (25-39)*CC			-1.30 *
Blk Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*CC			-1.61 *
Blk Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*CC			-0.85 ***
Blk Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*CC			-0.61 ***
CONSTANT	13.61 ***	13.50 ***	13.46 ***
R-squared	2.0%	2.8%	3.1%
N=	101,838	101,838	101,838

* p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Data Source: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 Annual Demographic Files from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
[1]Includes only immigrants who arrived prior to 1975.
[2]Includes American-born respondents with at least one foreign-born parent.

Table 6. Unstandardized Coefficients from OLS Regression Predicting Years of Education Among Women

	Model 1 β	Model 2 β	Model 3 β
RACE AND NATIVITY			
White First Generation (45-69)[1]	-0.79 ***	-0.89 ***	-0.46 ***
White Second Generation (25-39)[2]	1.21 ***	1.08 ***	1.21 ***
White Second Generation Mixed (25-39)	0.88 ***	0.83 ***	0.85 ***
White Third+ Generation (25-39)	0.46 ***	0.45 ***	0.44 ***
White Third+ Generation (45-69)	Referrent	Referrent	Referrent
Black First Generation (45-69)[1]	-0.55 **	-0.98 ***	-0.05
Black Second Generation (25-39)[2]	1.25 ***	0.85 **	1.76 ***
Black Second Generation Mixed (25-39)	0.63 **	0.46	1.06 ***
Black Third+ Generation (25-39)	-0.26 ***	-0.40 ***	-0.10 *
Black Third+ Generation (45-69)	-0.83 ***	-0.99 ***	-0.77 ***
DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS			
New York City CMSA (1=yes)		0.48 ***	0.68 ***
Central City Resident (1=yes)		0.38 ***	0.49 ***
INTERACTION TERMS			
Wht First Generation (45-69)*NYC			-1.66 ***
Wht Second Generation (25-39)*NYC			-0.91 ***
Wht Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*NYC			-0.23
Wht Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*NYC			0.07
Wht Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*NYC			Referrent
Blk First Generation (45-69)*NYC			-0.97 **
Blk Second Generation (25-39)*NYC			-0.25
Blk Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*NYC			-1.63 *
Blk Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*NYC			-0.70 ***
Blk Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*NYC			-0.63 ***
Wht First Generation (45-69)*CC			-0.71 ***
Wht Second Generation (25-39)*CC			0.14
Wht Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*CC			-0.10
Wht Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*CC			0.08
Wht Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*CC			Referrent
Blk First Generation (45-69)*CC			-0.86 *
Blk Second Generation (25-39)*CC			-1.55 **
Blk Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*CC			-0.86
Blk Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*CC			-0.62 ***
Blk Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*CC			-0.42 ***
CONSTANT	13.24 ***	13.17 ***	13.14 ***
R-squared	2.5%	3.1%	3.4%
N=	110,794	110,794	110,794

* p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Data Source: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 Annual Demographic Files from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
[1]Includes only immigrants who arrived prior to 1975.
[2]Includes American-born respondents with at least one foreign-born parent.

Table 7. Exponentiated Beta Coefficients from Logistic Regression Predicting College Graduation Among Men

	Model 1 β	Model 2 β	Model 3 β
RACE AND NATIVITY			
White First Generation (45-69)[1]	1.19 *	1.04	1.31 **
White Second Generation (25-39)[2]	1.44 ***	1.24 **	1.44 ***
White Second Generation Mixed (25-39)	1.30 ***	1.22 ***	1.19 **
White Third+ Generation (25-39)	0.92 ***	0.90 ***	0.89 ***
White Third+ Generation (45-69)	Referrent	Referrent	Referrent
Black First Generation (45-69)[1]	0.90	0.61 **	1.58
Black Second Generation (25-39)[2]	0.95	0.65	1.28
Black Second Generation Mixed (25-39)	0.78	0.62	1.03
Black Third+ Generation (25-39)	0.38 ***	0.32 ***	0.45 ***
Black Third+ Generation (45-69)	0.38 ***	0.31 ***	0.43 ***
DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS			
New York City CMSA (1=yes)		1.57 ***	1.66 ***
Central City Resident (1=yes)		1.55 ***	1.63 ***
INTERACTION TERMS			
Wht First Generation (45-69)*NYC			0.37 ***
Wht Second Generation (25-39)*NYC			0.77
Wht Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*NYC			0.92
Wht Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*NYC			1.08
Wht Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*NYC			Referrent
Blk First Generation (45-69)*NYC			0.28 **
Blk Second Generation (25-39)*NYC			0.69
Blk Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*NYC			0.96
Blk Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*NYC			0.75
Blk Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*NYC			0.68 **
Wht First Generation (45-69)*CC			0.88
Wht Second Generation (25-39)*CC			0.70 *
Wht Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*CC			1.10
Wht Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*CC			1.06
Wht Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*CC			Referrent
Blk First Generation (45-69)*CC			0.46 *
Blk Second Generation (25-39)*CC			0.36
Blk Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*CC			0.32
Blk Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*CC			0.53 ***
Blk Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*CC			0.57 ***
CONSTANT	0.46 ***	0.43 ***	0.42 ***
McFadden's R-squared	1.2%	1.8%	2.0%
N=	101,838	101,838	101,838

* p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Data Source: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 Annual Demographic Files from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
[1]Includes only immigrants who arrived prior to 1975.
[2]Includes American-born respondents with at least one foreign-born parent.

Table 8. Exponentiated Beta Coefficients from Logistic Regression Predicting College Graduation Among Women

	Model 1 β	Model 2 β	Model 3 β
RACE AND NATIVITY			
White First Generation (45-69)[1]	0.94	0.84 *	1.03
White Second Generation (25-39)[2]	2.48 ***	2.20 ***	2.49 ***
White Second Generation Mixed (25-39)	2.00 ***	1.89 ***	1.90 ***
White Third+ Generation (25-39)	1.40 ***	1.39 ***	1.35 ***
White Third+ Generation (45-69)	Referrent	Referrent	Referrent
Black First Generation (45-69)[1]	0.91	0.58 **	1.15
Black Second Generation (25-39)[2]	2.60 ***	1.77 **	3.19 ***
Black Second Generation Mixed (25-39)	1.54 *	1.30	2.27 **
Black Third+ Generation (25-39)	0.64 ***	0.55 ***	0.74 ***
Black Third+ Generation (45-69)	0.59 ***	0.50 ***	0.70 ***
DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS			
New York City CMSA (1=yes)		1.57 ***	1.72 ***
Central City Resident (1=yes)		1.45 ***	1.50 ***
INTERACTION TERMS			
Wht First Generation (45-69)*NYC			0.47 ***
Wht Second Generation (25-39)*NYC			0.56 **
Wht Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*NYC			0.78
Wht Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*NYC			1.09
Wht Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*NYC			Referrent
Blk First Generation (45-69)*NYC			0.38 **
Blk Second Generation (25-39)*NYC			0.91
Blk Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*NYC			0.37
Blk Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*NYC			0.59 ***
Blk Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*NYC			0.68 ***
Wht First Generation (45-69)*CC			0.76
Wht Second Generation (25-39)*CC			0.97
Wht Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*CC			1.08
Wht Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*CC			1.15 ***
Wht Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*CC			Referrent
Blk First Generation (45-69)*CC			0.75
Blk Second Generation (25-39)*CC			0.37 *
Blk Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*CC			0.38 *
Blk Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*CC			0.58 ***
Blk Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*CC			0.56 ***
CONSTANT	0.32 ***	0.29 ***	0.29 ***
McFadden's R-squared	1.3%	1.8%	2.1%
N=	110,794	110,794	110,794

* p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Data Source: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 Annual Demographic Files from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
[1]Includes only immigrants who arrived prior to 1975.
[2]Includes American-born respondents with at least one foreign-born parent.

Table 9. Exponentiated Beta Coefficients from Logistic Regression Predicting High School Graduation Among Men

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	β	β	β
RACE AND NATIVITY			
White First Generation (45-69)[1]	0.46 ***	0.43 ***	0.58 ***
White Second Generation (25-39)[2]	1.75 ***	1.59 **	1.68 **
White Second Generation Mixed (25-39)	2.36 ***	2.28 ***	2.66 ***
White Third+ Generation (25-39)	1.56 ***	1.55 ***	1.58 ***
White Third+ Generation (45-69)	Referrent	Referrent	Referrent
Black First Generation (45-69)[1]	0.58 **	0.46 ***	0.47 *
Black Second Generation (25-39)[2]	1.23	0.98	3.45
Black Second Generation Mixed (25-39)	1.03	0.92	0.93
Black Third+ Generation (25-39)	0.94	0.87 **	1.12
Black Third+ Generation (45-69)	0.34 ***	0.31 ***	0.36 ***
DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS			
New York City CMSA (1=yes)		1.46 ***	1.84 ***
Central City Resident (1=yes)		1.24 ***	1.60 ***
INTERACTION TERMS			
Wht First Generation (45-69)*NYC			0.39 ***
Wht Second Generation (25-39)*NYC			0.65
Wht Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*NYC			0.56
Wht Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*NYC			1.10
Wht Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*NYC			Referrent
Blk First Generation (45-69)*NYC			0.59
Blk Second Generation (25-39)*NYC			0.22
Blk Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*NYC			∞
Blk Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*NYC			0.52 ***
Blk Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*NYC			0.60 ***
Wht First Generation (45-69)*CC			0.48 ***
Wht Second Generation (25-39)*CC			0.85
Wht Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*CC			0.52 *
Wht Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*CC			0.79 **
Wht Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*CC			Referrent
Blk First Generation (45-69)*CC			0.99
Blk Second Generation (25-39)*CC			0.32
Blk Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*CC			0.53
Blk Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*CC			0.51 ***
Blk Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*CC			0.65 ***
CONSTANT	7.88 ***	7.55 ***	7.30 ***
McFadden's R-squared	2.7%	2.8%	3.0%
N=	101,838	101,838	101,838

* p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Data Source: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 Annual Demographic Files from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
[1]Includes only immigrants who arrived prior to 1975.
[2]Includes American-born respondents with at least one foreign-born parent.

Table 10. Exponentiated Beta Coefficients from Logistic Regression Predicting High School Graduation Among Women

	Model 1 β	Model 2 β	Model 3 β
RACE AND NATIVITY			
White First Generation (45-69)[1]	0.52 ***	0.50 ***	0.66 ***
White Second Generation (25-39)[2]	3.86 ***	3.66 ***	3.78 ***
White Second Generation Mixed (25-39)	2.32 ***	2.28 ***	2.88 ***
White Third+ Generation (25-39)	1.94 ***	1.94 ***	1.96 ***
White Third+ Generation (45-69)	Referrent	Referrent	Referrent
Black First Generation (45-69)[1]	0.54 ***	0.46 ***	0.67
Black Second Generation (25-39)[2]	1.56	1.35	4.56
Black Second Generation Mixed (25-39)	0.92	0.88	1.17
Black Third+ Generation (25-39)	0.87 ***	0.85 ***	1.09
Black Third+ Generation (45-69)	0.35 ***	0.34 ***	0.35 ***
DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS			
New York City CMSA (1=yes)		1.35 ***	1.81 ***
Central City Resident (1=yes)		1.02	1.20 ***
INTERACTION TERMS			
Wht First Generation (45-69)*NYC			0.33 ***
Wht Second Generation (25-39)*NYC			0.86
Wht Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*NYC			0.49 *
Wht Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*NYC			1.36
Wht Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*NYC			Referrent
Blk First Generation (45-69)*NYC			0.60
Blk Second Generation (25-39)*NYC			0.69
Blk Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*NYC			0.35
Blk Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*NYC			0.44 ***
Blk Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*NYC			0.59 ***
Wht First Generation (45-69)*CC			0.60
Wht Second Generation (25-39)*CC			0.76
Wht Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*CC			0.46 **
Wht Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*CC			0.85 *
Wht Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*CC			Referrent
Blk First Generation (45-69)*CC			0.61
Blk Second Generation (25-39)*CC			0.17
Blk Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*CC			0.66
Blk Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*CC			0.60 ***
Blk Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*CC			0.87 *
CONSTANT	8.23 ***	8.11 ***	7.86 ***
McFadden's R-squared	3.8%	3.9%	4.0%
N=	110,794	110,794	110,794

* p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Data Source: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 Annual Demographic Files from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
[1]Includes only immigrants who arrived prior to 1975.
[2]Includes American-born respondents with at least one foreign-born parent.

Table 11. Unstandardized Coefficients from OLS Regression Predicting Years of Education

	Women β		Men β		All β	
RACE AND NATIVITY						
White First Generation (45-69)[1]	-0.46	***	-0.29	*	-0.42	***
White Second Generation (25-39)[2]	1.21	***	0.59	***	0.91	***
White Second Generation Mixed (25-39)	0.85	***	0.49	***	0.68	***
White Third+ Generation (25-39)	0.44	***	0.01		0.23	***
White Third+ Generation (45-69)	Referrent		Referrent		Referrent	
Black First Generation (45-69)[1]	-0.05		-0.11		-0.07	
Black Second Generation (25-39)[2]	1.76	***	0.91		1.33	***
Black Second Generation Mixed (25-39)	1.06	***	0.47		0.81	**
Black Third+ Generation (25-39)	-0.10	*	-0.61	***	-0.34	***
Black Third+ Generation (45-69)	-0.77	***	-1.42	***	-1.07	***
DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS						
New York City CMSA (1=yes)	0.68	***	0.87	***	0.77	***
Central City Resident (1=yes)	0.49	***	0.78	***	0.63	***
INTERACTION TERMS						
Wht First Generation (45-69)*NYC	-1.66	***	-1.93	***	-1.76	***
Wht Second Generation (25-39)*NYC	-0.91	***	-0.76	**	-0.83	***
Wht Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*NYC	-0.23		-0.55	*	-0.38	*
Wht Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*NYC	0.07		-0.22	*	-0.07	
Wht Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*NYC	Referrent		Referrent		Referrent	
Blk First Generation (45-69)*NYC	-0.97	**	-1.63	***	-1.31	***
Blk Second Generation (25-39)*NYC	-0.25		-1.43	*	-0.79	
Blk Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*NYC	-1.63	*	-0.15		-1.04	*
Blk Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*NYC	-0.70	***	-0.82	***	-0.76	***
Blk Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*NYC	-0.63	***	-0.59	***	-0.62	***
Wht First Generation (45-69)*CC	-0.71	***	-0.28		-0.50	***
Wht Second Generation (25-39)*CC	0.14		-0.29		-0.07	
Wht Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*CC	-0.10		-0.09		-0.09	
Wht Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*CC	0.08		-0.15	**	-0.03	
Wht Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*CC	Referrent		Referrent		Referrent	
Blk First Generation (45-69)*CC	-0.86	*	-0.57		-0.74	*
Blk Second Generation (25-39)*CC	-1.55	**	-1.30	*	-1.36	**
Blk Second Generation - Mixed (25-39)*CC	-0.86		-1.61	*	-1.19	**
Blk Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*CC	-0.62	***	-0.85	***	-0.73	***
Blk Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*CC	-0.42	***	-0.61	***	-0.51	***
CONSTANT	13.14	***	13.46	***	13.30	***
R-squared	3.4%		3.1%		3.0%	
N=	110,795		101,838		212,633	

* p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Data Source: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 Annual Demographic Files from the Current Population Survey (CPS)

[1]Includes only immigrants who arrived prior to 1975.

[2]Includes American-born respondents with at least one foreign-born parent.

Table 12. Unstandardized Coefficients from OLS Regression Predicting Years of Education Among Residents of New York's Central City

	Net Effect of Residence New York City[3]
RACE AND NATIVITY	
White First Generation (45-69)[1]	-0.87
White Second Generation (25-39)[2]	0.49
White Second Generation Mixed (25-39)	0.92
White Third+ Generation (25-39)	1.30
White Third+ Generation (45-69)	1.40
Black First Generation (45-69)[1]	-0.65
Black Second Generation (25-39)[2]	-0.75
Black Second Generation Mixed (25-39)	-0.83
Black Third+ Generation (25-39)	-0.10
Black Third+ Generation (45-69)	0.27
N=	212,633

Data Source: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 Annual Demographic Files from the Current Population Survey (CPS)

[1]Includes only immigrants who arrived prior to 1975.

[2]Includes American-born respondents with at least one foreign-born parent.

[3]Calculated by adding main effects for New York CMSA and Central City with race-nativity interaction terms in Table 10. Expressed in years of education completed.